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The common law-the law of contracts, torts, and property-is in
the throes of a potentially remarkable transformation.' The
transformation is pervasive; many changes already have been adopted,
more are in process, and still more have been proposed. If they all come
to pass, the law will have experienced a once-in-a-century remaking.
More precisely, we may be observing the "un-making" of law, to use
Stephen Sugarman's phrase,2 as the principal common-law developments
of the twentieth century are rolled back. In this sense, the changes are
both radical and regressive, representing a classical revival, instituting in
the twenty-first century common law a barely updated version of the
classical law that reigned in the Gilded Age at the end of the nineteenth
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1. There is no entirely satisfactory term for this topic. "Common law" refers to the origins of
contracts, torts, and property in the English royal courts, but it also refers to judge-made law, as
distinguished from legislation, which is too limited for the discussion here. James Gordley, The
Common Law in the Twentieth Century: Some Unfinished Business, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1815, 1817
(2000). For Holmes, "common law" was the appropriate term before the age of statutes. OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (Mark Dewolfe Howe ed. 1963) (1881). Two other terms
are available, but neither of them is more precise or in common usage. "Private law" (as
distinguished from "public law") denotes that the core of the subject concerns relations among
private parties, rather than between private parties and the state, but it evokes the discredited
distinction between public and private law. "Civil law" (as distinguished from "criminal law")
normally refers to legal systems derived from Roman law. I have found that "common law" is the
best of all the potentially confusing possibilities.
2. Stephen D. Sugarman, Judges as Tort Law Un-Makers: Recent California Experience with
"New" Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 455 (1999); see JAY M. FEINMAN, UN-MAKING LAW: THE
CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN TO ROLL BACK THE COMMON LAW (2004).
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century. Even more broadly, the changes in the law and the vision that
animates them are part of a more general transformation of American
government and society.
This article describes the possibility of a classical revival in the
common law and situates the revival in its historical context. Part I sets
the stage by briefly summarizing a century and a half of common-law
development. At the end of the Nineteenth Century, classical legal
thought envisioned a highly systematic body of law through which courts
could mechanically apply abstract legal concepts to reach determinate
results, producing limited liability in contract and tort law and expansive
property rights. Critics beginning with Holmes and notably including
Progressives and legal realists attacked classical law as incomplete and
incoherent. Their critique was absorbed into the mainstream of the law,
and by the 1970s a new body of neoclassical law was dominant.
Part II describes the changes already adopted and currently
proposed in contract, tort, and property law-the un-making of
neoclassical law-and the distinctive structure and method of the
classical revival. In contract law, the classical revival aims to reinstate
the principle that courts should simply enforce the contracts people
make, through formalistic rules of formation and interpretation, and
should not impose terms or evaluate the fairness of bargains. In tort, the
revival seeks to restore corrective justice based on fault as the prime
objective by rolling back the generalization of liability for negligence,
narrowing products liability, and reducing the scope of compensatory
and punitive damages. In property, the revival focuses on expanding the
law of takings to limit the ability of the government to regulate property
owners in pursuit of the common good. All the individual changes fit
within a broader structure in which the boundaries among contract, tort,
and property are sharply defined, the market-focused subjects (contract
and property) are primary, and a revived formalist method is prescribed
for judicial decision.
The conclusion synthesizes the ideology of law, market, and society
that animates the classical revival, and situates the common-law changes
in their contemporary political context. The classical revival represents
an attempt to resuscitate the long-discredited ideas of classical legal
thought. This remarkable fact is best understood in this context: The un-
making of the common law is part of the effort by conservatives and
business interests to elevate the market and diminish the government.
I. ORIGINS: CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT AND CRITIQUE
Contracts, torts, and property have ancient origins, but most of their
history is barely relevant to understanding modern law. The story really
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begins with classical legal thought, the body of law usually seen as
dominant from 1870 to 1920. Thomas Grey writes that "classical
orthodoxy is the thesis to which modem American legal thought has
been the antithesis,",3 but there is a better way to put it. Classical legal
thought is the thesis, and the combination of sociological jurisprudence,
legal realism, and related Progressive ideas comprise a critique that is the
antithesis of classicism. Thesis and antithesis are resolved to a
considerable extent in the synthesis of modem law, the law that begins to
take shape after World War II and achieves its mature form in the 1970s.
Because in this resolution the critique supplemented and modified
classical law but did not supplant it altogether, this modem body of law
is often called "neoclassical law."4
A. Classical Law
Classical legal thought once was seen as the age of Lochner,5 in
which a conservative bench and bar reformulated the law to serve the
interests of the new corporate oligarchs.6 More recent scholarship has
shown that picture to be incomplete or misleading; although the effects
of classical jurisprudence may have served big business, the motivations
of its authors were more complex, including the important development
of an autonomous legal science and the preservation of traditional values
against emerging monopoly capitalism. 7 In any case, the inquiry here is
less about causes and consequences and more about the body of classical
law as a coherent whole against which later critics would react, the
3. Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 3 (1983).
4. lan Macneil first described modem law as "neoclassical." Ian R. Macneil, Contracts:
Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical. Neoclassical, and Relational
Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 854 (1978).
5. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
6. See WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE LOST WORLD OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT: LAW AND
IDEOLOGY IN AMERICA, 1886-1937, 152-164 (1998).
7. For a recent review, see Stephen A. Siegel, Comment, The Revision Thickens, 20 LAW &
HIST. REV. 631 (2002). Particularly useful works on classical legal thought include GREGORY S.
ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL
THOUGHT, 1776-1970 (1997) [hereinafter COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY]; LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA (1965); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960 (1992); Wiecek, supra note 6; Gregory S. Alexander, The Limits of
Freedom of Contract in the Age of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, in THE FALL AND RISE OF
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 103 (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999); Robert W. Gordon, Legal Thought and
Legal Practice in the Age ofAmerican Enterprise, 1870-1920, in PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL
IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA 70 (Gerald L. Geison ed., 1983); Grey, supra note 3; Duncan Kennedy,
Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal Thought
in America. 1850-1940, in 3 RESEARCH IN LAW AND SOCIOLOGY 3 (Rita J. Simon & Steven Spitzer
eds., 1980) [hereinafter Legal Consciousness].
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essential elements of which are being revived in our time. This section
briefly summarizes the content, structure, and method of classical law.
Grey defines the three essential characteristics of classical legal
thought:
First, it must be determinate, its judgments following from the
application of norms to facts, without the exercise of discretion or
contestable judgment. Second, it must be systematic, forming a
coherent structure of relatively abstract concepts and principles.
Finally, it must be autonomous, deriving its norms from
distinctively legal sources, rather than from the contestable claims
of religion, philosophy, or political economy.8
The substantive vision of classical legal thought is a world of
independent individuals, each of whom acts within a broad sphere of
legal autonomy to pursue his own self-interest. The role of government is
precisely defined and narrowly circumscribed. The legislature has
limited authority to regulate narrowly and traditionally defined harmful
activities. The courts, applying a complete, coherent, and formal body of
law, police the boundaries of legislative authority and define the ground
rules for interaction among private individuals, namely, the rules of
contract, tort, and property.
Classical contract law described a broad realm in which individuals
could exercise their autonomy by consenting to agreements with other
autonomous individuals. Individuals could accept the liability of an
enforceable contract by exercising consent and could be free from
liability unless consent had been exercised. The entire body of contract
doctrine flowed from this single principle. Grant Gilmore's
characterization that it was almost impossible to get into a contract and,
once a contract had been created, almost impossible to get out of, is
exaggerated but suggestive. 9 Formation rules required that there be an
identifiable moment at which the parties' consent matched to create a
contract; the metaphor of a trap being set and sprung is still used in
contract classes. Prior to the moment when the contractual trap was
sprung, the individual had no contractual liability. To spring the trap,
agreement had to be clear and definite. Because the model for consent
8. Thomas C. Grey, The New Formalism, Stanford Public Law and Legal Theory Working
Paper Series, 5 (Sept. 6, 1999), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract-id=200732
(last visited July 24, 2004).
9. See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (Ronald K. L. Collins ed., 1974). For
commentary on Gilmore's view, see Robert W. Gordon, The Death of Contract. By Grant Gilmore,
1974 WIS. L. REv. 1216 (1975) (book review); Ralph James Mooney, The Rise and Fall of Classical
Contract Law: A Response to Professor Gilmore, 55 OR. L. REv. 155 (1976) (book review);
Symposium, Reconsidering Grant Gilmore's The Death of Contract, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. I (1995).
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was the market transaction, the doctrine of consideration-"the balance-
wheel of the great machine"' ° -required that the agreement contain the
expression of an exchange. This requirement limited potential liability by
rendering gratuitous promises unenforceable. At the moment the trap was
sprung, liability attached and excuses for nonperformance were limited.
The agreement presentiated the terms of performance and the events of
breach, so interpretation questions could be resolved by adverting to the
plain meaning of the contract. When a breach occurred, it violated the
expectation created by the agreement and damages could be quantified
by referring to that expectation. Because of the paradigm of the market
transaction, expectation damages for the economic equivalent of loss was
the ordinary remedy and specific performance was rare. The binary
nature of liability (either a contract had been consented to or it had not)
precluded the award of alternative measures such as reliance or
restitution damages.
While contract law defined a broad scope of individual autonomy,
tort law encompassed a much narrower realm in which the law
recognized liability for harm wrongfully committed.'" Tort liability,
unlike contract liability, was not created by the consent of the parties, but
neither was it imposed by the courts. Instead, tort law was corrective
justice through which the law provided recompense when one person
caused injury by invading the preexisting right to bodily security held by
another person. For liability to be imposed, corrective justice required
that the defendant must have been at fault and must have caused the
injury. In classical tort law, each of these elements had a fixed meaning.
Fault quickly became identified with negligence, and negligence with the
failure to adhere to objective standards of conduct. The widespread
American rejection of Rylands v. Fletcher12 and its strict liability
principle, for example, was based in large part on its imposition of
liability without fault.' 3 Where the court could be seen as simply
acknowledging an objective causal link between the defendant's act and
the plaintiffs injury, it merely recognized the invasion of an established
interest rather than selecting a basis of liability.
10. GILMORE, supra note 9, at 19.
I1. See HORWITZ, supra note 7, at 12-13, 51-63, 121-127; cf Robert L. Rabin, The Historical
Development of the Fault Principle: A Reinterpretation, 15 GA. L. REv. 925 (1981) (providing a
historical analysis of the fault principle as it applies to tort law).
12. L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
13. HORWITZ, supra note 7, at 124-25.
2004]
Seattle University Law Review
The law of property was more of an agglomeration, because of its
antique categories and doctrinal variety.14 Nevertheless, a core concept of
classical property law developed. Blackstone's concept of property as
"sole and despotic dominion"' 5 was dephysicalized and commodified.
Where once property had largely been associated with land, the
generalization of the market in classical law led to an understanding of
property as "everything which has exchangeable value," as Justice
Swayne wrote in dissent in the Slaughterhouse Cases.'6 Property was
defined by the ability to be exchanged, and the purpose of property was
to be exchanged. An individual's right to own property included the
creation, exchange, and accumulation of wealth of all kinds, from
dynastic trusts to corporate wealth. The state could control property
rights only in limited ways, under traditional doctrines and consistent
with the ability of an owner to realize the value of property; classical
property law "sanctioned capitalist accumulation, the starkest sort of
property-as-wealth . . . and it created a large private domain of
unregulated and unregulatable market activity."' 7
The classical ideal was realized through a rigid structure that drew
sharp distinctions between realms of authority and areas of law. First,
public law was distinguished from private law. Public law encompassed
the area in which the legislature could legitimately exercise its regulatory
and coercive authority-the police power. Private law, by contrast, was
defined and governed by individual rights to own property, to contract,
and to take any other action that did not invade the rights of other
persons. Because its content flowed from legal rights, private law did not
require the kinds of policy choices that the legislature made in public
law. Second, within private law, clear lines were drawn between
contracts, torts, and property. Each subject had a proper sphere of
authority, defined by the subjects' respective organizing principles of
consent, fault, and ownership.
In exercising the police power, the legislature could consider
political and distributive concerns, so that legislative choice was, in a
technical sense, unprincipled. Courts, by contrast, were nonpolitical
institutions that did not exercise discretion or make political judgments.
They could maintain this posture by applying the distinctive decisional
14. Grey describes classical property as "the doctrinal dumping ground for the anomalous
survivals of the pre-liberal family and land-based legal order." Grey, supra note 3, at 48; see
ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY, supra note 7; HORWITZ, supra note 7, at ch. 5.
15. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *2.
16.83 U.S. 36, 127 (1872).
17. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY, supra note 7, at 275. Alexander notes that the
older, republican or proprietarian conception of property persisted in this period, "albeit in a
weakened form." Id. at 276.
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method of formal legal reasoning. A court engaged in legal reasoning
began with the few basic propositions that lay at the heart of the common
law, such as "an exercise of consent creates a contract;" sometimes these
principles were obvious, while in other instances they were defined by
induction from an examination of cases. Judges then used inexorable,
deductive logic to generate narrower doctrinal rules and decisions in
individual cases, all of which were merely specific instances of the basic
propositions. Any preexisting rules or decided cases that did not conform
to the derived logic were discarded. The task was made simpler by
devices such as the prevalence of binary categories. A statement was
either a manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain sufficient to
constitute an offer or it was not; there was no intermediate category of,
say, a promise which could be relied on even though it was not an offer.
For some, of whom Langdell was the most notable,' 8 the primary
attraction of classical legal reasoning was its claim to be a scientific
method, an application of the rigorous, logical process of induction and
deduction that simultaneously developed in the natural and social
sciences. For others, the primary attraction of the classical method was
political, in the sense that it guaranteed that rights would be defined and
protected without the exercise of potentially redistributive choice by the
courts.
B. The Critique of Classical Law
The critique of classical legal thought began almost at the moment
of classical thought's creation. 19 In The Common Law in 1881, Holmes
was the theorist and objectivist who outlined much of the structure and
18. See generally WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGIN OF MODERN
AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION (1994) and ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN
AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980s 52 (1983) (discussing Langdell's view that legal reasoning
was a scientific method and how this influenced law school curricula and the legal community);
Grey, supra note 3, at 13, 20.
19. The literature on the critique of classical law is vast. Works I have found particularly
helpful include: HORWITZ, supra note 7; N.E.H. HULL, ROSCOE POUND AND KARL LLEWELLYN:
SEARCHING FOR AN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1997); DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF
ADJUDICATION: FIN DE SIECLE (1997) [hereinafter CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION]; JOHN HENRY
SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE (1995); WILLIAM
TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1985); G. Edward White, From
Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and Social Change in Early Twentieth-
Century America, 58 VA. L. REV. 999 (1972); Gordon, supra note 7; Grey, supra note 8; Thomas C.
Grey, Modern American Legal Thought, 106 YALE L.J. 493 (1996) (reviewing NEIL DUXBURY,
PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1995)); Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to the
Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon Fuller's "Consideration and Form, " 100 COLUM. L. REV. 94
(2000) [hereinafter Will Theory]; Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 Cal. L. Rev.
1151 (1985); Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465 (1988).
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content of classical law even as he rejected its conceptualist method.20
By the late 1890s, in "Privilege, Malice, and Intent"21 and "The Path of
,,22the Law,' as pragmatist, skeptic, and empiricist Holmes had begun the
23process of undermining classical law's integrity.
Holmes was followed by successive waves of pragmatists,
Progressives, sociological jurisprudents, and legal realists through the
1930s who revealed in detail the weaknesses of classical law. The
divergence in intellectual approach and political orientation among the
critics was great. The dispute between Roscoe Pound and Karl Llewellyn
is the most famous, 24 but any movement, or even succession of
movements, that includes Cardozo, Frank, Corbin, Moore, Sturges, and
Fuller will be very diverse.a What each of these critics minimally shared
was distaste for at least some elements of classical thought, commonly
the grand classical claims to abstraction, autonomy, and rigor.26
From the perspective of the subsequent developments, a useful
entry point in seeing how classical law collapsed is by examining the
most arcane, scholastic effort at critique of the twentieth century. Wesley
Newcomb Hohfeld attempted to construct a new taxonomy of legal
relationships in his exquisite tables of "Jural Correlatives" and "Jural
Opposites, ''27 but the destructive effect of his work was more important
than the reconstruction.2 8 Hohfeld explained that general concepts such
as ownership were descriptive rather than normative, that they were in
fact composed of many different legal relations, and that the concepts
were two-sided, so that obligation rather than entitlement could be
described as the basis of legal relationships. To say that one owns
property, for example, simply summarizes a set of legal relationships
between the owner and non-owners. The relationships can be specified
more precisely, as in the right to exclude and the privilege to enter, or the
relationships can be reversed, focusing on the obligations they impose on
the non-owner rather than the benefits they bestow on the owner; a duty
to not trespass is the consequence of a right to exclude. The lawyer-
economist Robert Hale applied and contextualized the analysis,
dissecting "liberty," "property," "freedom," and "coercion" to show that
20. HOLMES, supra note 1.
21. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1894).
22. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 181 (1920).
23. HORWITZ, supra note 7, at 127-143; KENNEDY, CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION, supra note
19, at 85.
24. See generally HULL, supra note 19.
25. On the range of views, see id.; SCHLEGEL, supra note 19; White, supra note 19.
26. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 490 (2002).
27. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917).
28. ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM, ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY 5-6 (2d ed. 1993).
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these concepts represented the exercise of legal power, not the absence of
it, and so lacked the axiomatic content ascribed to them by classical
law. 29 Property, for example, consisted of a set of Hohfeldian interests
that enabled an owner to exercise the power of the state in withholding
access to the property from others unless they bargained on his terms.
"The law has delegated to him a discretionary power over the rights and
duties of others., 30 Similarly, bargains are not free contracts but rather
mutual coercions set against a background of market inequality
established by legal entitlements. By the time the critique had crested in
1930, Felix Cohen would summarize much of the classical method as
"transcendental nonsense," or the use of such empty concepts to reach
circular results.
3'
Under this view, courts in common-law cases were engaged in the
allocation of rights, not the application of rights, and in that respect they
were as much public law entities engaged in distributional judgments as
the legislature. Contract, property, and tort law all necessarily involve
discretion in imposing legal liability. Nor could the discretion be vitiated
by a formal, rule-based body of doctrine, because the traditional concepts
were incapable of providing that degree of formality. The inadequacy of
language and the complexity of facts made the ideal unrealizable; rules
could not be both precise and comprehensive, so judges, not rules,
decided the cases. Therefore the public-private distinction in general and
the organizing principles of the common law subjects in particular were
incapable of carrying the weight the classicists attributed to them.
If the common law involved policy choices, its individualist,
market-oriented principles were at least incomplete if not invalid. The
critics offered to supplement or replace those principles from two
directions. The first direction, grounded in their scientific and
functionalist bent, was empirical. Law ought to attend to the realities of
the world, complex as they might be. The principles of individualism and
the market were found wanting when tested against the circumstances of
lack of personal choice in an imperfect world, concentrations of
economic power, and networks of social relations. The second direction,
grounded as much in the critics' Progressive politics as in their academic
approach, focused on the collectivist concern of social welfare as an
antidote to excessive individualism. Here, too, concern for instrumental
29. BARBARA FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND THE
FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT (1998); HORWITZ, supra note 7, at 163-164, 195-98.
30. Robert L. Hale, Rate Making and the Revision of the Property Concept, 22 COLUM. L.
REV. 209, 214 (1922).
31. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L.
REV. 809 (1935).
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policymaking to achieve Progressive social objectives required departure
from the classical ideal. In each of the subjects, the critique demonstrated
that the classical method and substance needed to be discarded in favor
of a more complex, functional analysis.
The critique of the law of contracts began with the demonstration
by Hale and others that classical concepts-assent, consideration, and the
like-could not maintain their burden of establishing contract law as
exclusively a realm of private ordering. Indeed, even courts claiming to
adhere to the classical program were never entirely on board, as
famously demonstrated by Llewellyn on formation cases, 32 Corbin on
consideration and reliance,33 and Fuller on remedies, 34 among others. The
principal defect was the binary, presentiated character of classical
contract law. Critics pointed out that no determinate legal expectation
arises as an objective fact from the parties' agreement and that the binary
approach disserves the policies of protecting the interests that contract
law should advance. Contract, in theory, did not take into account the
complexity of social reality, including the unequal distribution of
economic advantage in society and the haphazard and inattentive way in
which private parties regard contract law. The point, then, was to focus
more on social needs than on abstract principles. For some, the needs
were adequately articulated in the case law, so a more careful reading of
the cases was all that was needed. For others, the solutions lay in resort
to norms of commercial practice, as Llewellyn ultimately incorporated in
the Uniform Commercial Code.
In tort law, too, the attack came on classical law in concept and in
application. Classical law had posited a negligence duty that was
universal in scope but limited in application, constrained by narrow
doctrines of causation and fault. The critics of objective causation, from
Nicholas St. John Green35 through Leon Green, 36 demonstrated that the
causation inquiry does not determine an objective fact but entails
discretionary judgments about how far liability should extend, and they
argued causation should be reduced to a simple factual inquiry that was
of little use in assigning liability. Leon Green, among others, also argued
that the negligence principle at the core of classical tort law, like other
32. K.N. Llewellyn, Our Case-Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance, 11, 48 YALE L.J. 779
(1939).
33. See, Gilmore, supra note 9, at 61-85.
34. L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages:], 46
YALE L.J. 52 (1936); L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract
Damages: 2,46 YALE L.J. 373 (1937).
35. Nicholas St. John Green, Proximate and Remote Cause, 4 AM. L. REV. 201 (1870).
36. LEON GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE (1927).
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classical principles, was too general.37 The issue in a torts case was not
whether there existed a general duty that had been violated, but whether
this defendant owed a duty to this plaintiff in these circumstances. That
relational determination, unlike classical deduction, required immersion
in the facts and balancing of the individual and social interests involved.
Immersion and balancing led in several directions. For Green
particularly, it required attention to the actual decision process in cases,
in which juries played a greater role than classical principles.3 8 For many
critics, immersion in facts required attention to social circumstances and
the construction of separate rules for separate categories of cases in an
almost-legislative fashion. Looking at large groups of cases led to a
statistical conception of risk which, combined with interest balancing,
led to a diminished role for causation and fault.
39
In property, as in classical law, the disaggregated nature of the
subject meant that the critique found it harder to penetrate the law.
Hohfeld's devastating analysis of fundamental conceptions was quickly
incorporated into the terminology of the first Restatement, but its
immediate effect on doctrine was less clear.40 The critique's major effect
was in dissolving the classical bars to state regulation of property. In the
takings cases, for example, the issue became not whether abstractly
defined property rights had been taken, but, as Miller v. Schoene4 1 most
dramatically illustrated, how Hohfeldian interests should be allocated
and to what degree the court should defer to a legislative judgment about
allocation. In that case, the United States Supreme Court concluded that
where the legislature's choice to favor the interest of growers of apple
trees over growers of cedar trees "is unavoidable, we cannot say that its
exercise, controlled by considerations of social policy which are not
unreasonable, involves any denial of due process. 42 The zoning
revolution, sanctioned by the Court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co.,43 proceeded on a similar basis.
C. The Critique Consolidated
The critique of classical legal thought flourished in the 1920s and
early 1930s, undermining the classical claims to abstraction, coherence,
and autonomy. The critique initially had its greatest impact in the legal
37. Leon Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1014 (1928);
Leon Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases: 11, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 255 (1929).
38. Leon Green, The Negligence Issue, 37 YALE L.J. 1029 (1928).
39. HORWITZ, supra note 7, at 59-60.
40. CUNNINGHAM, ET AL., supra note 28, at 5-6.
41. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
42. Id. at 280.
43. Viii. of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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academy, but it also made its way into the mainstream of the law. That
development was problematic but necessary. It was problematic because
the critique, if taken to its fullest extent, would have made it difficult for
courts to maintain their status as institutions independent of the political
will. It was necessary because the critics of classical legal thought almost
uniformly regarded their critique as the basis for reform of the law, not
its destruction. As it happened, the tumult in the academy over its
problematic aspect and the chastening effect of the rise of fascism,
Nazism, and Stalinism delayed the final achievements of the reformers
and their successors until the second half of the twentieth century.44
During that period, the main focus of legal thought shifted to public
law, under the influence of the rise of the administrative state and then
Brown v. Board of Education.45 The process jurisprudence of reasoned
elaboration and neutral principles was the dominant topic of the day.4 6
But scholarship revising and extending the critique of classical common
law and, considering its implications, also returned to a prominent place
in the academy. Dawson,47 Sharp, 48 and Kessler 49 in contracts, James5°
51 52and Green in torts, and McDougal and Haber in property, among
many others, created a new body of scholarship that lay between the
criticism of the pre-war era and the arid mode of doctrinal scholarship
that no intellectual movement has ever succeeded in stifling.
The signal events of the period began in the 1940s, however, not in
the law reviews but in venues more directly applicable to law in the
courts. The first event was the publication of Prosser's treatise on torts,
which went through successive editions from 1941 to 1971 . The treatise
embodied an odd but irresistible mix of corrosive theory from the
critique and comforting resort to quasi-doctrinal formulations. The
overall approach incorporated the insight that tort law is an exercise in
interest balancing, but the interests were systematized into neat groups of
44. HORWITZ, supra note 7, at ch. 9; G. Edward White, The Evolution of Reasoned
Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L. REV. 279, 282-83 (1973).
45. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
46. White, supra note 44, at 286-91.
47. E.g., John P. Dawson, Economic Duress-an Essay in Perspective, 45 MICH. L. REV. 253
(1947).
48. E.g., Malcolm Sharp, Promises, Mistake, and Reciprocity, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 286 (1952).
49. E.g., Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of
Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943).
50. E.g., Fleming James Jr. & Roger F. Perry, Legal Cause, 60 YALE L.J. 761 (1951).
51. E.g., Leon Green, Tort Law Public Law in Disguise, 38 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1959).
52. E.g., MYRES S. McDOUGAL & DAVID HABER, PROPERTY, WEALTH, LAND: ALLOCATION,
PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT (1948).
53. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS (1941); see G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN
AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY ch.5 (1980).
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cases that took on the status of doctrinal rules. The second event was the
publication of the proposed Uniform Commercial Code.54  First
promulgated in 1948, the Code did not become widely adopted until the
mid-1960s, but its intellectual approach was unchanged over that time.
Drafted by a less revolutionary Llewellyn, the U.C.C. incorporated the
functionalist, anti-formal insights of the critique, embodying doctrine
made flexible through resort to "situation-sense," Llewellyn's term for
fact-specific, quasi-normative empiricism.
55
These and other approaches percolated through the 1950s and early
1960s. By the mid-i 970s the more destructive elements of these critiques
had been tamed or driven underground and its other insights incorporated
into neoclassical law as generally considered and applied.
The core concept of classical law was individual autonomy, derived
from abstract principle and embodied in the right to own property, the
right to contract, and the right to act without being subject to
unwarranted tort liability. The critique demonstrated that the concept of
autonomy was at best incomplete and at worst illusory. Neoclassical law
began by balancing individual autonomy and non-individualist
considerations of social welfare.56 Neoclassical tort law, for example,
merged corrective justice principles in an individual case with social
interests in compensation and accident prevention.
A particularly important area for this balancing is the market.
Market transactions in the real world are often not characterized by the
exercise of autonomy, but are plagued by inequality and market failures.
For example, the market may not provide low-income workers and
consumers with meaningful choices to realize basic human needs.
Moreover, the market is not the measure of all things. Non-market values
such as community, collective responsibility, and protection of the
disadvantaged also are important. Accordingly, the law regulates and
intervenes in market transactions.57 Contract law, for example, balances
assent with fairness norms derived from commercial practice and from
the broader society. Under neoclassical law, this approach was
54. See TWINING, supra note 19; Allen R. Kamp, Downtown Code: A History of the Uniform
Commercial Code 1949-1954, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 359 (2001); Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman, The
Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant Rules, 100 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1987).
55. KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 60 (1960); see
Jay M. Feinman, Promissory Estoppel and Judicial Method, 97 HARV. L. REV. 678, 698-708
(1984).
56. In this discussion neoclassical law is referred to in the past tense simply for clarity. It has
not passed into history, of course; the contemporary scene is a struggle between neoclassical law,
which is the mainstream of the immediate past, and the classical revival, which aims to become the
mainstream of the future.
57. "Having created the conditions that make markets possible, democracy must also do all the
things that markets undo or cannot do." BENJAMIN R. BARBER, JIHAD VS. MCWORLD 243 (1995).
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unavoidable. Law constructs social relations, including market relations,
through its doctrines, by prescribing terms of ownership and exchange.
Therefore, law is necessarily constitutive and regulatory.
Neoclassical courts had to immerse themselves in the world they
regulated. In the decision of individual cases, courts need to construct
detailed accounts of the events and context to reach proper conclusions.
Each case is also representative of a larger area of social process, and
courts, now engaged overtly in regulating that social process, need a
broad understanding of it. Once engaged in that kind of detailed
contextual inquiry, potentially in every case and actually in many cases,
courts are faced with choices about social policy. Courts as much as
legislatures necessarily and appropriately engage in policymaking when
they formulate and apply doctrine, typically in the form of vague
standards that leave play for contextual and policy inquiries in future
cases. For example, where the original Restatements were typically cast
as syllogistic rules, the second Restatements are replete with standards
made up of "factors to be considered."
Therefore, by the 1970s, the full effects of the critique, in revised
form, were finally felt in the law. The generalization of negligence and
the rise of products liability in torts, consumerism and the adoption of
flexible rules in contracts, and a regulatory property law best exemplified
by the revolution in landlord-tenant law, created in a mature form the
kind of law for which the critics of classicism, in their reformist mode,
had been striving. The second round of Restatements solidified many of
the developments. By 1980, neoclassical law had arrived.
I. THE TRANSFORMATION OF CONTRACT, TORT, AND PROPERTY LAW
The contemporary changes adopted, underway, and proposed in the
common-law subjects are diverse and broad-ranging, but they share a
common core. Despite a century of critique and neoclassical
development, the changes attempt to revive elements of the classical
common law. This part highlights some of the most significant
developments in each of the subjects.
A. Contract Law
Two major developments in neoclassical contract law were the
contextualization of previously abstract doctrine and the recognition of
the necessity of regulating market transactions. In the 1960s and 1970s,
these developments culminated in a wave of progressive legislation and
well-known judicial decisions. Statutes such as the Uniform Commercial
[Vol. 28:1
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Code and the Truth in Lending Act 8 mandated more disclosure of
contract terms. The U.C.C. also expanded formation doctrines. A
contract could be found based on the bargain in fact, even though the
moment of its formation was undetermined and previously essential
terms such as price and quantity were missing.59 Courts also expanded on
the process of contract interpretation; insurance contracts in particular
were interpreted according to the reasonable expectations of the
subordinate party, 60 and a relaxed parol evidence rule undermined the
primacy of written agreements.61 Courts also recognized the full
complexity of contractual settings; promissory estoppel expanded to
provide a remedy for reliance (and, arguably, even reasonable
expectations without reliance) created by promises that failed the
62traditional standards of assent and consideration. And courts felt free to
review the fairness of contracts, especially between parties of unequal
bargaining power; unconscionability enabled courts to strike down
oppressive contract terms, from the cross-collateral clause in a consumer
installment sale in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.63 to the
arbitration provision signed by an experienced concert promoter in
Graham v. Scissor Tail, Inc.
6 4
The classical revival challenges these developments, arguing that
the law has departed from the core principle governing contract law:
Courts should simply enforce the contracts people make. In this view,
neoclassical contract law makes two mistakes.
First, it diminishes personal freedom, of which freedom of contract
is an essential element in a market economy. As Judge Kozinski of the
Ninth Circuit writes,
Perhaps most troubling, the willingness of courts to subordinate
voluntary contractual arrangements to their own sense of public
policy and proper business decorum deprives individuals of an
important measure of freedom. The right to enter into contracts-to
adjust one's legal relationships by mutual agreement with other free
individuals-was unknown through much of history and is
unknown even today in many parts of the world. Like other aspects
of personal autonomy, it is too easily smothered by government
officials eager to tell us what's best for us.
65
58. 15 U.S.C. § 1601-1693 (2004).
59. U.C.C. §§ 1-201(3), 2-204, 2-305, 2-311 (2004).
60. Eg., C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975).
61. 2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 7.3, at 199 (1990).
62. See infra notes 91-93and accompanying text.
63. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
64. 623 P.2d 165 (Cal. 1981).
65. Oki Am., Inc. v. Microtech Int'l, Inc., 872 F.2d 312, 316 (9th Cir. 1989).
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Second, because parties are the best judges of their own interest,
and because the market, left to its own devices, will produce the best
results for society, detrimental results are likely to happen when courts
interfere with contracts. Richard Epstein explains the superiority of the
enforcement of contracts over legal intervention:
[Contract] law can facilitate (not compel, but facilitate) sizable
productive interactions which will continue to expand over time and
transactions until they embrace all individuals who possess the
minimum capacity to engage in contracting at all. The system goes
forward in a benevolent fashion because the exchanges are mutually
beneficial. . . . The background knowledge of the uniform
incentives moving self-interested parties is a more reliable guide to
their interests than any public vetting of their deal.66
The solution to these problems is to revert to a simple model of
contract based on an ideal market, strictly enforcing the bargains that
parties make, not reading beyond the four corners of a document in
enforcing a contract, and certainly not evaluating the bargains for
fairness. The model is so simple that it can ignore the complexities of the
modern world. "For all its minor differences, and with a little
refurbishing at the edges, we could do as well with the Roman law of
contract as we do with any modern system dedicated to the principle of
freedom of contract, as our system too often is not.",
67
As a result, law under the classical revival emphasizes abstraction
over contextualization. In general, this means less attention to the factual
details of a particular case or of the class of cases of which it is
representative and more attention to the complexities of real-world
contracting as a means of better understanding and regulating the parties'
contract. Contract law also becomes more abstract in a particular way.
The process of abstraction moves the principles of contract to more
closely resemble those of an ideal market, and the market model achieves
primacy as the source of contract doctrine.
Under the classical revival, formality reigns at two levels. First, the
contract doctrine itself becomes more formal; ostensibly clear, rigid rules
are favored over flexible standards. Second, the substance of the rules
favors formality in contracting practices. Written contracts (including
standard form contracts) are favored over oral contracts; the
interpretation of contracts looks primarily to their plain meaning; and
parties are given great freedom to define the terms of their relationships
without examination or intervention by the law. The practical
66. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 78-79 (1995).
67. Id. at 327.
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consequence of the implementation of this vision is that businesses can
use contract law more effectively to control relationships with their
customers and employees because they can more easily dictate the terms
of dealing, avoid being legally bound except on their own terms, avoid
review by the courts of the fairness of those terms, and control how
disputes are resolved under their contracts. The sections that follow
illustrate the principles and their consequences by discussing formation
doctrines, including approaches to form contracts and rolling contracts;
the decline of reliance; the parol evidence rule; and the enforcement of
mandatory arbitration clauses.
1. Form contracts
The most common kind of contract today involves a standard form
containing many terms, drafted by a business that enters into many such
deals, that is presented to the other party on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.
68
Nearly a hundred years ago, Edwin Patterson imported the French term
"adhesion contract" for this type of arrangement, because the party
presented with the contract only has the choice of adhering to its terms or
not, rather than negotiating. 69 The law always has had difficulty
accommodating adhesion contracts within the model of bargained
contracts, but the classical revival aims to resolve this difficulty by, in
Charles Knapp's phrase, treating them as "sacred cows" rather than
"dangerous animals, likely to do harm unless confined and tamed.,
70
The United States Supreme Court illustrated this approach in
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute.7' Eulala Shute, on a seven-day
Carnival cruise with her husband, slipped on a deck mat during a guided
tour of the ship's galley and subsequently sued Carnival for her injuries
in federal court in Washington, her home state.72 Carnival moved to
dismiss because a clause in the cruise contract required that all litigation
be brought in Florida, where it was headquartered. 73 The majority of the
Court felt no need to address whether the Shutes had actually agreed to
the clause, because the Shutes "conceded that they were given notice of
the forum provision and, therefore, presumably retained the option of
68. Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV.
1174 (1983).
69. Edwin W. Patterson, The Delivery of a Life-Insurance Policy, 33 HARV. L. REV. 198, 222
(1919).
70. Charles W. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract Law, 71
FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 789 (2002).
71. 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
72. Id. at 588.
73. Id.
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rejecting the contract with impunity." 74 Here the rule about presumed
agreements to form contracts is framed in terms of freedom of contract
and the free market; the Shutes were provided with the contract terms
and so they were bound to the terms because they were free market
actors, regardless of whether they actually did read the terms, easily
could have read them, or could have bargained about them with
Carnival.75
The Court's conclusion, that the Shutes had adequate notice of the
forum selection clause, rests on a formal concept of notice and assent.76
What the Court viewed as the Shutes' concession, in their lawyer's brief,
that they had notice of the terms was laden with sarcasm: "The forum
selection clause was reasonably communicated to the respondents, as
much as three pages of fine print can be communicated." In this
setting, as Justice Stevens stated in dissent, "only the most meticulous
passenger is likely to become aware of the forum-selection provision,"
because it was included only in fine print as the eighth of twenty-five
numbered paragraphs on the ticket, a means of presentation so obscure
that he included a copy of the ticket in his opinion. 78 Moreover, the
Shutes did not receive the official ticket with these terms until after they
had purchased their cruise, and another of the terms stated that the price
of the cruise was non-refundable. 79 Therefore, even if the Shutes actually
read the ticket and understood its import, the only way they could avoid
the forum selection clause would be to give up their vacation plans at the
last minute and forfeit the price they paid, or at least go to Florida to
litigate in an attempt to get a refund.8 °
The same rigid approach has been advocated for shrink-wrap,
browse-wrap, and click-wrap contracts. Here sellers include the contract
terms on the package or sealed inside it (shrink-wrap), or on a computer
screen when loading software or obtaining access to a web site where the
user can see the terms (browse-wrap) or must click on an "I accept"
button before using the product (click-wrap). The formal approach to
contracting enables businesses to use any of these devices to dictate
terms more easily.
The most controversial instance of the shrink-wrap/click-
wrap/browse-wrap problem involves "rolling contracts." In Hill v.
74. Id. at 590.
75. Id.
76. See id. at 595.
77. Id. at 590.
78. Id. at 597.
79. Id. at 587, 597.
80. Id. at 590 (Blackmun, J.); id. at 597 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see Jean Braucher, The
Afterlife of Contract, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 49, 61-68 (1995).
[Vol. 28:1
Un-Making Law
Gateway 2000, Inc.81 and ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg,82 a pair of
controversial opinions by Judge Frank Easterbrook of the Seventh
Circuit, classical revival principles of formation were used to hold that a
business controls the process of agreement so that terms disclosed only
after a consumer has made a purchase are still binding.
In Hill, for example, Rich and Enza Hill called Gateway and
ordered a computer system, giving their credit card number in payment.83
When the delivery arrived, the box included their new computer, the
usual assortment of cables and manuals, and a sheet of paper with a set
of boilerplate terms, including a statement that the Hills were bound by
the terms unless they returned the computer within thirty days.84 When
their computer did not work some months later and Gateway would not
repair it, they sued. 85 Gateway defended by pointing to one of the
boilerplate terms that stated they had given up their right to sue Gateway
86and instead had to take any claims to arbitration.
Judge Easterbrook, discounting the application of U.C.C. section 2-
207 and giving short shrift to the relevant state law, ruled that no contract
had been formed when the Hills ordered their computer and gave their
credit card number in payment, in return for which Gateway's
representative promised to ship the computer.87 Instead, the terms of
Gateway's form contracts determined the process of offer and
acceptance, so the sale was really made and the Hills were bound by
Gateway's terms when they failed to return the computer to Gateway
within the thirty-day period.8 If they wanted to avoid the terms,
including the arbitration clause, they would have had to pack up the
computer and ship it back within thirty days, at their own expense.89 The
court assumed Gateway was only offering to sell and specifying that the
form of acceptance was the Hills' keeping the computer for thirty days,
even though that "offer" was not communicated to the Hills at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful fashion-on the telephone, for
example. 90
What is most significant about Hill and ProCD, however, is their
status as landmark embodiments of the classical revival principle that
81. 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
82. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).




87. Id. at 1149.
88. Id. at 1149-50.
89. Id. at 1150.
90. Id. at 1149-50.
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dominant contracting parties can use standard forms and manipulate the
mode of agreement to bind their customers without meaningful assent,
notice, or opportunity to pursue other terms. It transforms the normal into
the unexpected-giving a credit card number on the phone is not really a
sale. Then the unexpected becomes normal; more and more, companies
like Gateway can dictate the terms on which their products are purchased
and used with only the barest illusion of consent. As Stewart Macaulay
explained, under Hill, "misrepresentation is the oil that lubricates
capitalism."
91
The far shores of inferring agreement in these settings are
reached by the procedures permitted under the Uniform Computer
Information Transactions Act ("UCITA"). The prospects for enactment
beyond the two states that have adopted it are dim because its sponsor,
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, has
stated that it will no longer seek adoptions. Nevertheless, the principles
underlying UCITA embody the classical revival and its proponents can
be expected to advance the principles in other ways.92 UCITA's stated
guiding vision is the anachronistic "freedom of contract," and it
implements that vision in rules of assent. Under UCITA, agreement to
any contract terms is presumed if, among sales pitches, product
descriptions, advertisements, and other information on a web page, there
is a link to the information, a link to another web site that contains the
information, the address of such a web site, or even instructions that a
consumer who wants to see the terms can link to or e-mail for a copy. As
a result, the consumer is bound to terms even if she does not know they
exist, does not have to scroll through the terms, does not have easy
access to them, or does not know that using the service or downloading
the software constitutes agreement to the fine print.
93
An alternative to these principles of formation was presented in the
revision process of U.C.C. Article 2. The history of the revision is
tortuous, but the fate of one proposal exemplifies the power of the new
vision of contract. The Reporter for the revision, Professor Richard
Speidel of Northwestern University, and his drafting committee,
following an insight of Llewellyn, proposed that the law recognize the
reality that there are two different kinds of contract: those in which the
parties dicker about the details and those made by standard forms
91. Symposium, The Gateway Thread - AALS Contracts Listserv, 16 TOURO L. REV. 1147,
1149 (2000).
92. UCITA §§ 112-114, 208 (1999).
93. Amelia H. Boss, Taking UCITA on the Road: What Lessons Have We Learned?, 7 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 167, 188-90 (2001).
94. Richard E. Speidel, Revising U.C.C. Article 2: A View from the Trenches, 52 HASTINGS
L.J. 607, 615 (2001).
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incorporating standard terms. Under their proposal, a seller using a form
contract would have a heightened obligation to bring its terms to the
other party's attention at the risk of otherwise having them excluded
from the contract. In a consumer sales contract, for example, if a
reasonable consumer would not have expected a particular term (such as
a pre-dispute, mandatory arbitration clause) to be in the contract, the
term would be unenforceable unless the consumer in the particular case
had actually agreed to its inclusion.
95
Gail Hillebrand of Consumers Union described this innovation as
the "single most important improvement for consumers" in the revision
process, but it was quickly whittled down and ultimately discarded.96
First, small businesses were removed from the protection of the section.
Then the concepts of standard forms and standard terms were eliminated
from the revision, a step that left the proposed section "hung out to dry,"
in Speidel's view; without defining standard-form contracting as the
source of the problem, it became impossible to agree on a standard for
surprise or unfairness that the courts could use in reviewing contract
terms. 97 Finally, even the limited version of the section was deleted from
the revision.98
2. Reliance
From the 1920s through the 1970s, as contract law became more
flexible, courts became more inclined to find a contract even when the
parties' behavior fell short of the paradigm of bargaining resulting in a
formal written contract. Because the classical revival favors formal,
written contracts, it disfavors imposing liability in other circumstances;
under this approach, a court should find a contract only when the
formalities of contracting have been observed.
This shift is seen most dramatically in the weakening of promissory
estoppel, the darling doctrine of the 1960s and 1970s, which offered a
widely applicable means of subverting the formal requirements of
traditional contract law, making enforceable a promise on which
someone relied even if the promise did not meet the traditional standards
for forming a contract. Many judges and scholars embraced the doctrine,
and a cottage industry arose among law professors in defining its scope.
99
95. James J. White, Form Contracts Under Revised Article 2, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 315, 315
(1997).
96. Gail Hillebrand, The Uniform Commercial Code Drafting Process: Will Articles 2, 2B and
9 Be Fair to Consumers? 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 69, 76 (1997).
97. Speidel. supra note 94, at 616.
98. Id.
99. For a review, see Charles L. Knapp, Rescuing Reliance: The Perils of Promissory Estoppel,
49 HASTINGS L.J. 1191 (1998).
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Some synthesized the cases to assert that any credible promise made in
furtherance of economic activity was enforceable; others pointed to the
particular salience of the doctrine in cases in which the parties have
different degrees of commercial sophistication or are enmeshed in a
broader relationship involving trust and confidence.'00 Confronted by an
attitude that favors formal contracting and looks skeptically at claims of
reliance on less formal promises, however, this turned out to be "a
revolution that wasn't."''
°
Most striking is the way in which commercially sophisticated
parties can use the limits of the doctrine to renege on promises made to
the unwitting--exactly the setting in which courts in leading cases such
as Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores10 2 thought justice demanded a remedy.
One common situation involves workers who are promised long-term
employment and then are disappointed to find that the promise is not
enforceable. Professor Sidney DeLong catalogued examples of employer
statements that do not rise to the level of promises:
Employees have been held to have had no right to rely on language
such as the following as a promise of permanent employment:
"Don't worry about being fired;" "You will be here until you
retire;" "I have no intention of firing you;" "You will not have to be
concerned about job security because you have a job here as long as
you want or until you retire;" "You will have continued and secure
employment;" "You will have a job until you retire; we'll have you
for the next twelve years;" "Your position will never be taken away
and you can have it as long as you want it;" "You have full-time,
permanent employment;" "I don't see a problem with you working
until you are sixty-five;" "You will retire from this company;" "You
will be the first person to work here for fifty years;" "You will
never have to worry about your job;" "Should I look for another
job?" "No, your job is secure;" "The only person that can eliminate
you is yourself; you have a permanent job."
' 103
3. Interpretation
The parol evidence rule addresses the extent to which written
agreements will be favored over less formal interactions of the parties. In
100. Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and
the -Invisible Handshake, " 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 903, 904-05 (1985); Juliet P. Kostritsky, A New
Theory of Assent-Based Liability Emerging Under the Guise of Promissory Estoppel: An
Explanation and Defense, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 895, 906 (1987).
101. Sidney W. DeLong, The New Requirement of Enforcement Reliance in Commercial
Promissory Estoppel: Section 90 as Catch 22, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 943, 943 (1997).
102. 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965).
103. Id. at 1004-1005.
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its classic formulation, the rule states that when the parties to a contract
have adopted a writing as the complete and final integration of their
agreement, the court will not admit evidence of prior or
contemporaneous oral agreements to vary or contradict the writing.1
0 4
Throughout the modem era, there have been two general views on
the application of the rule, still referred to as the Williston and Corbin
views after the scholars who best articulated them. In essence, the
Williston view enshrines objectivism and formalism, with obeisance to
plain meaning, by asserting that the question of whether an agreement is
a complete and final integration can be determined from the face of the
document itself read in light of common understandings of the nature of
such transactions. The Corbin view focuses on the integration as a
question of fact; the issue in any case is whether the parties intended the
writing to be complete and final, and extrinsic evidence, including the
parol agreement and other words and conduct of the parties, is always
relevant to the determination of that question.
Neoclassical contract law embodied the Corbin view, consistent
with its emphasis on contextualization and equity.'0 5 This approach
reached its apogee in a trilogy of California cases 10 6 "that seemed to
refute for all time the conceptualist beliefs that written promises are more
sacred than oral ones, that words have objectively determinable
104. FARNSWORTH, supra note 61, at §7.3.
105. Id. at 199.
106. Masterson v. Sine, 436 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas
Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1968); Delta Dynamics, Inc. v. Arioto, 446 P.2d 785
(Cal. 1968).
The crucial issue in determining whether there has been an integration is whether the
parties intended their writing to serve as the exclusive embodiment of their agreement...
California cases have stated that whether there was an integration is to be determined
solely from the face of the instrument and that the question for the court is whether it
,appears to be a complete ... agreement .... .' Neither of these strict formulations of the
rule, however, has been consistently applied. . . . It is therefore evident that 'The
conception of a writing as wholly and intrinsically self-determinative of the parties' intent
to make it a sole memorial of one or seven or twenty-seven subjects of negotiation is an
impossible one.'
Evidence of oral collateral agreements should be excluded only when the fact finder is
likely to be misled . . . .Corbin suggests that, even in situations where the court
concludes that it would not have been natural for the parties to make the alleged collateral
oral agreement, parol evidence of such an agreement should nevertheless be permitted if
the court is convinced that the unnatural actually happened in the case being adjudicated.
If the court believes that the parties intended a collateral agreement to be effective, there
is no reason to keep the evidence from the jury.
Masterson, 436 P.2d at 564-66 (citations omitted).
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meanings, and that juries cannot be trusted to interpret contracts in the
public interest."' 0 7
The classical revival challenges this tenet of neoclassical law. °8
Judge Kozinski, in an opinion criticizing the California law, warned that
the approach "casts a long shadow of uncertainty" over contracts, and
even "chips away at the foundation of our legal system."' 0 9 "If we are
unwilling to say that parties, dealing face to face, can come up with
language that binds them, how can we send anyone to jail for violating
statutes consisting of mere words . . . ?Are all attempts to develop the
law in a reasoned and principled fashion doomed to failure . . . ?"110
Conservative activist lawyer Theodore Olson, recently Solicitor General,
concurred, warning that judicial intervention was required "if anything is
to remain of the integrity of written contracts."' I" Even the editorial page
of The Wall Street Journal labeled the flexible approach "high
weirdness."' 12
The alternative paradigm of contracting presented by the classical
revival is the complete written contract, and when a written contract
exists, evidence of alternate interpretations or varying terms are
excluded. As a doctrinal matter, this vision is realized by first reverting
to a classical, Willistonian view that focuses on the four corners of the
document itself as the touchstone. In Gerdlund v. Electronic Dispensers
Int'l,113 for example, the court gave new weight to the facial conflict
between the written and parol agreements." 14 What the California trilogy,
other courts, and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts" 5 had taken to
be a factor to be considered in determining the parties' intent had now
become a conclusive rule. Rather than permitting the jury to decide as a
matter of fact whether the parties had intended the writing to be an
integration, the court could first determine whether the parol agreement
might "naturally" be made separately or would "certainly" have been
included in the writing, and determine that issue solely from the writings
107. Ralph James Mooney, The New Conceptualism in Contract Law, 74 OR. L. REV. 1131,
1151 (1995).
108. See id For a more nuanced view of California cases, see Harry G. Prince, Contract
Interpretation in California: Plain Meaning. Parol Evidence, and Use of the "Just Result"
Principle, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 557 (1998).
109. Trident Ctr. v. Ct. Gen. Life Ins., 847 F.2d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1988).
110. Id.
I 11. L. Gordon Crovitz, Rescuing Contracts from High Weirdness, WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 1988,
16; cited in A CONTRACTS ANTHOLOGY 423, 425 (Peter Linzer ed., 2d ed. 1995).
112. Crovitz, supra note Ill.
113. 235 Cal. Rptr. 279 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
114. Id.
115. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 240 (1981).
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themselves. If the latter, the matter was concluded and the parol
agreement would be excluded."
6
Courts also have cut back on the flexible, contextual neoclassical
law by expanding the cases to which the parol evidence rule applies.
Traditionally, the rule never barred introduction of parol evidence to
interpret an agreement or to bar evidence of modification of a contract.
Recent cases have departed from these tenets as well, relying again on
the face of the written agreement as conclusive evidence of its
meaning.' 17
And in a striking departure from a traditional exception to the parol
evidence rule, the California Court of Appeal held in Marketing West,
Inc. v. Sanyo Fisher Corp. that not only is an oral promise that is
inconsistent with a written agreement unenforceable, but the oral
promises may not be considered to show that there was not an
enforceable contract in the first place." 8 When the Sanyo and Fisher
companies merged, sales representatives in the home appliance division
were required to sign new contracts that provided that they could be
terminated without cause on ninety days notice. When they were
summoned to a meeting in New Jersey to sign the contracts, however, the
company's Senior Vice President told them that
the New Jersey Agreements had been developed for use by Sanyo's
other divisions, but that plaintiffs were being asked to sign only for
the purpose of uniformity, and the New Jersey Agreements would
have no effect on plaintiffs' division. Plaintiffs were further
informed that the agreements "did not mean anything," did not
change the terms of their relationship with Sanyo, were just part of
the reorganization process involved in the merger, and that the
execution of the New Jersey Agreements was a mere "formality"
and was "just pro forma," and that the . . . sales representatives
would not be replaced by an in-house sales staff as long as [they]
continued to perform.
Subsequently, Sanyo Fisher fired the sales representatives, claiming
the right to do so under a ninety-day notice provision in the "New Jersey
Agreements" without regard for their prior contracts, which permitted
termination only for good cause.
The California court concluded that the attack by Kozinski and
others was well grounded; strict rules of interpretation made written
116. Gerdlund, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 283; see also Banco de Brasil v. Latian, Inc., 285 Cal. Rptr.
870 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
117. See Mooney, supra note 107, at 1148-59.
118. Mktg. W., Inc. v. Sanyo Fisher Corp., 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 859 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
119. Mktg. W., Inc., 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 861-862.
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agreements conclusive, particularly where, as here, the agreement
contained a merger clause. Therefore, the ninety-day termination clause
governed, not the prior agreements, and the vice president's oral
denigration of the New Jersey agreements as having "no effect" and "not
mean[ing] anything" did not undermine the validity of the contract.'
2 0
4. Dispute resolution
A basic tenet of neoclassical law was that contract law was
regulatory as well as facilitative. The primary function of contract law is
to facilitate private ordering through consensual transactions, but
contract law itself was a form of public ordering. In deciding which
promises to enforce, how to interpret and fill gaps in them, and what
remedies to provide for breach, the law's authority superceded that of
private individuals, even where it chose to look to their actions to guide
its own decisions. Courts exercised their regulatory role in establishing
standards of good faith, policing the bargaining process and, at the
extreme, refusing to enforce contracts or terms that were contrary to
public policy or unconscionable.
The classical revival is less willing to exercise an overt regulatory
role. Contract law, in this vision, primarily functions to enforce the
contracts private parties have made. Neoclassical law would see this
principle as a delegation (or an abdication) of the lawmaking function to
private parties, but the classical revival considers it an appropriate,
limited role for the courts. A basic principle of the classical revival in
contract law is that the apparent consent of contracting parties will not be
overcome by concern for a disadvantaged party or the public interest
except in the most extreme cases.
The most prominent example involves the now-routine enforcement
of pre-dispute, mandatory arbitration clauses. As originally practiced,
arbitration was an expeditious, efficient means of dispute resolution in
merchant communities, commonly selected by the parties after a dispute
had arisen. 22 Over time, arbitration has become "consumerized,"
involving not only commercial parties but also employees, credit card
borrowers, brokerage firm customers, and consumers in a wide range of
120. Id, at 862; see also Susan Martin-Davidson, Yes, Judge Kozinski, There is a Parol
Evidence Rule in California-The Lessons of a Pyrrhic Victory, 25 Sw. U. L. REV. 1 (1995)
(discussing Mktg. W, Inc., 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 859 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)).
121. On arbitration, see generally, IAN R. MACNEIL, ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW:
AGREEMENTS, AWARDS AND REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT (1994 & Supp.
1999).
122. Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 854-56 (1961).
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ordinary transactions. 23 In these contexts, it has effectively supplanted
the ordinary process of litigation.' 24 Typically, the selection of arbitration
to the exclusion of litigation, the designation of an arbitral forum, and
any limitations on the scope of arbitration are made by the dominant
party in a transaction in an adhesion contract in advance of any dispute
arising. The forum is likely to be most amenable to that dominant party,
in terms of location, authority, and predilection. The source of arbitrators
is likely to be favorable to the dominant party; the classic example is
mandatory arbitration between securities firms and their customers,
where arbitrators are drawn from industry representatives. Because
dominant parties are repeat players, arbitrators who consistently disfavor
them are likely not to be selected. The arbitrators often will be barred
from awarding punitive damages or other extraordinary remedies.
Arbitration can preempt not only ordinary litigation but participation in
class actions. The risk of arbitration may be greater to the consumer than
the risks of litigation because of a "loser pays" provision, which is
inconsistent with the American rule on attorney fees in litigation. 
25
For a time, arbitration agreements were subject to two checks. As
contracts of adhesion, courts examined whether the consumer had
actually assented to the arbitration provision, often requiring a separate
expression of assent. 126 Arbitration agreements also were viewed
skeptically by the courts and subject to review on public policy grounds.
The second of these had declined somewhat through the neoclassical
period, but it still colored inquiries into the first, which were vital. A
casebook example is Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 12 7 in which the
California Supreme Court held that rock impresario Bill Graham was not
bound to an adhesion contract signed with Leon Russell and prepared by
the musician's union, on grounds of unconscionability. Even though
Graham was an experienced promoter, the court refused enforcement
123. Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages and the Consumerization of Arbitration, 92
NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1997).
124. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Contract and Conflict Management, 2001 Wis. L. REV. 831,
888-92(2001).
125. See Charles W. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract Law,
71 FORDHAM L. REV. 761 (2002); Jack M. Sabatino, ADR as "Litigation Lite: " Procedural and
Evidentiary Norms Embedded Within Alternative Dispute Resolution, 47 EMORY L.J. 1289 (1998);
Jean R. Stemlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool? Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for
Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 674-97 (1996); Jean R. Stemlight, Is the U.S. Out on a
Limb? Comparing the U.S. Approach to Mandatory Consumer and Employment Arbitration to that
of the Rest of the World, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 831, 832-43 (2002).
126. See, e.g., Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165 (Cal. 1981); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1981).
127. Scissor-Tail, 623 P.2d at 165.
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because the "classical model of free contracting" was increasingly
irrelevant to the "realities" of modern contracting.)
2
The expansion of consumer arbitration received its major
endorsement by the United States Supreme Court in a series of cases
beginning in the 1980s. In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury
Construction Corp.' 29 in 1983, the Court read the act as "a congressional
declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,
notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the
contrary . . . .As a matter of federal law, any doubts .. .should be
resolved in favor of arbitration."'130 In a dozen cases since, the Court has
approved arbitration in different settings and has brought a wide range of
issues within the federal arbitration policy. 31 The Court's expansion
extends beyond the types of relationships in which arbitration clauses are
enforceable to issues that arise about the conduct of arbitration. It has
held, for example, that disclosure requirements for arbitration clauses
conflict with the federal policy favoring arbitration; any special state rule
governing arbitration contracts is invalid. 32 Likewise, the fact that
discovery is more limited or that costs may be greater in arbitration
rather than in court does not deprive employees of their right to pursue
claims, even those arising under federal discrimination statutes. 1
33
The Court did leave open the possibility that some arbitration
schemes are so unfair as to be unconscionable. There continues to be
much litigation about the unconscionability of particular arbitration
schemes, and some are struck down as too one-sided, yet advocates of
the classical revival continue to press the issue. Arbitration clauses that
have been successfully defended against unconscionability claims
include those where the customer was bound to arbitrate but the
company was not, where class actions and punitive damages were barred,
and where the company could dictate the rules for arbitration and select
the arbitrator. 34 Some advocates have argued that unconscionability has
128. Id. at 171 (internal quotation marks omitted).
129. 460 U.S. I (1983).
130. Id. at 24-25.
13 1. For reviews, see Richard M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer
Contracts: A Call for Reform, 38 Hous. L. REV. 1237 (2001); Knapp, supra note 125, at 776-777
n.59.
132. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 683 (1996).
133. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991); Green Tree Fin.
Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89-92 (2000) (discussing the costs of arbitration); Terry
Carter, Arbitration Pendulum, A.B.A. J., May 2003, at 14.
134. Knapp, supra note 125, at 796.
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no role to play at all in these cases, because of the paramount federal
policy favoring arbitration.' 35
The spread of arbitration is the ultimate triumph of the principles
underlying the revival of classical contract law. Through arbitration,
contract law effectively supplants legal regulation. The enforcement of
mandatory arbitration clauses prevents the courts from ever being able to
judge the legality of any clause of the contract or a party's behavior
under it; private ordering trumps public ordering, and a formal
conception of freedom of contract replaces law.
B. Tort Law
The formulaic purposes of tort law are to provide incentives for
proper conduct and to compensate victims of harm within a system that
is fair to plaintiffs and defendants and administrable by the courts.
36
Under classical law, these purposes were pursued through a system of
corrective justice based on objective principles of fault and causation.
The critique of classical law established that fault and causation were
subjective judgments about policy, not objective facts, so the baseline
against which corrective justice could be measured was illusory.
Neoclassical tort law, accordingly, was explicitly policy-oriented.
Fairness and the fault principle on which it is based still play a role, but
fairness as individual corrective justice is correlated with fairness
redefined in collective terms as the advancement of the more important
policies of injury prevention and compensation, often best achieved
through loss-spreading. As Leon Green noted in a famous article, tort
law is "public law in disguise" (although the disguise was increasingly
less necessary in the years after he wrote), the primary purpose of which
is to provide a remedy "for the every day hurts inflicted by the
multitudinous activities of our society."'
137
A principal vehicle of the transformation from an exclusive focus
on corrective justice to a primary focus on collective justice was the
adoption of enterprise liability as a basic principle of tort law. The
precise contours of enterprise liability 138 and the historical process by
135. Brief of Amici Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the United States at 5-9, Discover Bank
v. Super. Ct. Los Angeles County, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 526 (2003) (No. Si13725), available at
http://www.uschamber.com/NR/rdonlyres/eaenofx6c4xu22awey3swnhxku7xw7wwfegb7jt5qqddxc5
e2a6qkzkiwlzb4altyawdkdzrz5ut5i/DiscoverBankvBoehr.pdf (last visited July 17, 2004).
136. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 12-13 (2000); W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §4 (5th ed. 1984).
137. Green, supra note 51, at 257, 269.
138. See, e.g., Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived Case
for Enterprise Liability, 91 MICH. L. REV. 683 (1993); Mark Geistfeld, Should Enterprise Liability
Replace the Rule of Strict Liability for Abnormally Dangerous Activities? 45 UCLA L. REV. 611
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which it came to prominence in tort law 39 have been much debated, but
the core concept is widely adopted. Activities and enterprises, especially
business enterprises, should internalize the costs of the accidents they
produce and distribute the costs among those who participate in or
benefit from the activity. Enterprise liability promotes safety by placing
the incentive to reduce accident costs on the entity best able to control
risks, and it provides a means of compensating injured victims. By
shifting the locus of analysis from an individual accident to the enterprise
or activity in which the injurer is engaged, enterprise liability embodies a
principle of fairness as well.
This shift flows from the contextual and functional elements of the
critique of classical law. Individual disputes are increasingly seen as
incidents of the tort system; the defendant's conduct and plaintiffs harm
in a particular case represent risk-bearing activity and a need for
compensation across a class of injuries, rather than primarily being an
occasion for the correction of a particular wrong. The class can be
defined very generally (tort law as a system for compensation and
accident reduction) or more particularly (injuries caused by a class of
defective products as a particular social problem).
At any level, tort law is functional, designed to respond to social
conditions beyond those of the parties to the instant case. The use of law
to respond to those conditions is necessary in the Hohfeldian sense that
the decision to impose or not impose liability is equally an allocation of
legal interests and an exercise of state power;140 interest-balancing, the
method developed out of the critique of Green and others, makes explicit
the allocation process. The use of law is also desirable because the other
available vehicles for solving the problems presented by injury are
inadequate. In the 1960s and 1970s, the perception that markets had
failed to generate an adequate level of safety created a demand for
judicial and legislative solutions.'
4'
The classical revival aims to reestablish fault in a more traditional,
corrective justice sense as the basis of liability, but with a nod to the
policy orientation of neoclassical law. The revival rests on two essential
points.
(1998); Gregory C. Keating, The Theory of Enterprise Liability and Common Law Strict Liability, 54
VAND. L. REV. 1285, 1286-87 (2001); George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A
Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 520
(1985).
139. See, e.g., Priest, supra note 138; Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Ideology of
Enterprise Liability, 55 MD. L. REV. 1190, 1190-92 (1996); Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and
the Possible End of the Rise of Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601, 634-47 (1992).
140. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
141. See Schwartz, supra note 139, at 615-620.
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The first point is principled, and it refers back to the classical idea
of objective fault and causation. The neoclassical expansion of tort
liability, because it is not based on a traditional conception of fault,
imposes unfair burdens on social actors. Some of the unfairness is
produced by doctrine. The imposition of strict liability on products
manufacturers is the most obvious example; because tort is a system of
corrective justice, strict liability as a form of enterprise liability in the
absence of proof of the manufacturer's fault is unfair. Within the law of
negligence, the expansion of liability through foreseeability or other tests
of duty goes too far in imposing liability out of proportion to fault. The
diminution of the plaintiffs fault as a defense and the expansion of
liability and damages for emotional harm, future harm, and loss of
chance have similar effects. Some of the unfairness is institutional. The
doctrinal developments are the product of judges out of tune with
established principles and social realities. Courts also exercise too little
control over sympathetic juries, and the incentives for plaintiffs' lawyers,
particularly in large cases and class actions, skew the law in favor of
liability as well; judges are alternately and contradictorily activist
crusaders for more liability yet too weak to keep the system in check.
"Some members of the judiciary have become quite willing to adopt
exotic legal theories and less willing to temper the abuses of plaintiffs'
lawyers." 
142
The second point is explicitly policy-oriented. Neoclassical tort law
balanced market and non-market values in furthering the tort policies of
incentives, compensation, and fairness. The classical revival focuses on
social welfare as defined by individual freedom working though the
market. From this perspective, the traditional policy goals of tort law are
viewed through a market mechanism and restated as providing
reasonable incentives for balancing productive behavior against safety
and compensation through a not-too-expensive system of liability. The
goal is a system that does not burden market entrepreneurs too much. In
the analysis of tort problems, compensation is de-emphasized and
incentives are left much more to market forces than to legal intervention.
At the same time, the market focus promotes personal responsibility in
society. Neoclassical law focused on the responsibility of injurers for the
harm they cause; the classical revival focuses on the responsibility of the
injured, arguing that an excessive reliance on loss-shifting through tort
liability saps individual will and responsibility. Thus the classical revival
begins where neoclassical law begins, with policy in context, and feeds
142. Daniel J. Popeo, Advertorial, It's Time for Judicial Tort Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13,
1999, at A19.
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back to a relatively abstract, market-oriented approach to the tort system.
This approach coincides with the principled point about fairness, seen in
relatively traditional terms; excessive liability is both unfair to individual
market actors and unproductive for the market as a whole.
This vision of tort law and tort reform crystallized during the
Reagan Administration, in the Report of the Tort Policy Working
Group. 143 The report begins by identifying a "rapidly expanding crisis in
liability insurance availability and affordability," and dismisses any
explanation for the crisis-economic conditions, a fall in interest rates, or
insurance company mismanagement-other than four "problem areas" in
tort law. Three of the areas relate to the core elements of the classical
revival: the decline of fault as a basis of liability, the undermining of
causation, and the "explosive growth" in damage awards, a growth
caused by disregard of the established principles of fault and causation.
The fourth problem area is the allegedly high transaction costs of the
system, only of benefit to lawyers, presumably caused by litigating
exaggerated or spurious claims. In short:
Too many defendants are found liable (or forced into settlements)
where there should be no liability, either because they engaged in no
wrongful activity, or because they did not cause the underlying injury.
Damages have become excessive, particularly in the area of non-
economic damages such as pain and suffering, mental anguish and
punitive damages.
As a result of these problems, the burden of the tort system on the
economy is too large, with insurance against the risk of liability either
unavailable or unaffordable.1
44
The report then presents a non-exhaustive list of reforms "which if
implemented should return tort law to a credible fault-based
compensation system that provides a fair and reasonable level of
compensation to deserving plaintiffs through a more predictable and
affordable liability allocating mechanism."' 145 The first two reforms
reestablish the core principles: "Retain fault as the basis for liability"'
' 46
and "[b]ase causation findings on credible scientific and medical
evidence and opinions."'147 The next four aim to reduce victims'
143. REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP ON THE CAUSES, EXTENT AND POLICY
IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY (Feb.
1986) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP].
144. Id. at 1, 25-29, 30-42, 52.
145. Id. at 60.
146. Id. at 61.
147. Id. at 62.
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damages, by eliminating joint and several liability, limiting noneconomic
damages (including limiting or abolishing punitive damages), providing
for periodic payment of damages, and abolishing the collateral source
rule. The two remaining recommendations go to process: Reduce
contingency fees and establish alternative dispute resolution mechanisms
with strong disincentives to litigation. Along the way, the report suggests
other means of reducing liability, such as establishing the preemptive
effect of findings by the Food and Drug Administration or other
government regulators, and aggressively excluding scientific and medical
evidence often used by victims to establish how they were harmed.
48
The Working Group Report sets a common theme for the classical
revival in tort law. The problem is institutional as well as doctrinal. Too
many people are suing, juries are too sympathetic to victims in their
search for deep pockets, and judges are unwilling to rein in aggressive
lawyers and excessive jury verdicts. The reforms, therefore, must be
institutional as well as doctrinal. Most of the discussion in this article
focuses on the doctrine, but the institutional reforms need mention as
well. These include draconian limitations on contingent fee contracts,
defendant-favorable early offer rules, class action limitations, and
regulation of the retainer of private attorneys by public entities.
Stephen Sugarman opined that the report's recommendations reflect
less an intellectually coherent approach to tort law and more an attempt
"to turn the tort law clock back to the 1950s," to a time when businesses
were less often liable for the injuries they caused, "when tort law was not
very expensive, yet still could be pointed to as a hallowed American
process for identifying and punishing clearly bad conduct."' 149 That
assessment is too generous by half a century. The Working Group Report
looks back a hundred years to set the pattern for the classical revival in
tort law and its political manifestation, the tort reform movement, in
returning to a posture when only the truly deserving are compensated,
and then only to the extent of their actual injury. To achieve that end, the
classical revival attempts to halt the spread of general negligence
liability, particularly by reestablishing categorical immunities; to cut
back on products liability, by moving away from a consumer
expectations test and narrowing the risk-utility test; to narrow causation
rules; and to limit compensatory and punitive damages awarded to
victims.
148. Id. at 60-75.
149. STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW 78-81 (1989).
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National Rifle Association to withdraw its support. 153 The Personal
Responsibility in Food Consumption Act-the "cheeseburger bill"-
aims to provide immunity to food manufacturers and sellers for health
claims related to obesity. 5 4 The massive energy bill of the 2003-04
congressional session contained a controversial immunity for
manufacturers of MTBE, a gasoline additive that has polluted water
supplies around the country, resulting in dozens of pending suits and
settlements of more than $100 million. Controversy over the immunity




While negligence cases are most numerous in tort law, the most
significant area of development in neoclassical law was the law of
products liability. Courts increasingly recognized that injuries caused by
dangerous products were a social problem of great magnitude that could
not be addressed either by trusting the market to work things out or by
the law of negligence. Most famously, in the Escola case in 1944, the
majority of the California Supreme Court adopted a tortured reading of
the law of negligence to let Escola recover, but Justice Roger Traynor
laid the path for a more direct approach:
[I]t should now be recognized that a manufacturer incurs an
absolute liability when an article that he has placed on the market..
. proves to have a defect that causes injury to human beings ...
[P]ublic policy demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it will
most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in
defective products that reach the market."
5 6
Two decades after Escola, Justice Traynor would write for a
unanimous Supreme Court that a manufacturer was liable for defective
design without regard for negligence:
A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on
the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for
defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being
153. H.R. 1036, 108th Cong. (lst Sess. 2003); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Senate Leaders Scuttle
Gun Bill Over Changes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2004, at A20.
154. H.R. 339, 108th Cong. (2d Sess. 2004).
155. Seth Borenstein & Sumana Chatterjee, Energy Bill Would Benefit Industry, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Nov. 16, 2003, at A13; Editorial, Out of Gas, NEWS AND OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.),
Dec. 16, 2003, at A12; Bruce Alpert and Bill Walsh, On the Hill; News from the Louisiana
Delegation in the Nation's Capital, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 7, 2003, at 10.
156. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 440-441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor,
J., concurring).
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. . . . The purpose of such liability is to insure that the costs of
injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the
manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by
the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves.' 
57
Products liability law exploded in the 1960s and 1970s following
the widespread adoption of the principles of section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, particularly its concept of strict liability
grounded in enterprise liability. Over time, the scope of strict products
liability expanded, encompassing cases of defective manufacture and
design and inadequate warning. The doctrine permitted actions by
injured bystanders as well as the actual users of products, actions against
retailers, franchisors, and predecessor and successor corporations, and
actions involving leased goods, used goods, and even "products" such as
rental apartments.
58
The movement in the law of products liability from expansive strict
liability rules to more limited rules of negligence, and the attempts to
push the limitations even further, may be the leading example of the
classical revival in tort law. The challenge has been widely recognized.
From the late 1940s through the early 1980s, for example, California was
the leading jurisdiction for the expansion of products liability, but the
approach of the current California Supreme Court has recently been
characterized as "slowly, but steadily, pushing California products
liability law away from any remaining pretense of strict liability into a
decidedly fault-based framework (apart from routine manufacturing
defect cases)."' 59 More generally, the leading torts hornbook captions its
discussion of products liability "Development, Rationales, and Decline
of Strict Products Liability."'
' 60
The fault-oriented fairness and market-oriented policy rationales for
cutting back on products liability have been clearly articulated. The
American Tort Reform Association, leading advocate for statutory tort
reform, explains as follows:
Product liability laws are intended to protect consumers from injury
due to the manufacturing and sale of unreasonably unsafe products.
The standard of absolute liability aims to encourage accident
prevention by holding manufacturers, who are in the best position to
reduce or eliminate injuries, fully liable for injuries caused by their
products.
157. Greenman v. Yuba Power Co. 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963).
158. DOBBS, supra note 136, at ch. 24.
159. Sugarman, supra note 2, at 479.
160. DOBBS, supra note 136, at §353.
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This premise, however, unfairly holds manufacturers liable for any
injury related to their activity regardless of their ability to foresee an
imminent injury or the consumer's ability to prevent it.
As the brunt of responsibility has fallen on manufacturers, product
liability insurance premiums have risen [at] twice the rate of
inflation in recent years. As a result, many U.S. firms have opted to
discontinue product research, cut back on introducing new product
lines, and raise prices. Ultimately, the abuse of product liability
laws offers consumers fewer domestic products at higher prices and
compromises the competitiveness of U.S. firms in foreign and
domestic markets. 161
The classical revival would narrow the reach of products liability
law. For example, the basis of products liability was always participating
in the chain of distribution of a product, but there is a broad effort to
reverse that presumption, immunizing distributors and retailers in whole
or part except for their individual negligence. 162 In another limitation,
statutes undertake to prohibit suits brought by cities against gun
manufacturers for the wrongful marketing and distribution of
handguns. 1
63
The definition of a design defect has been a major focus for
narrowing liability. The most expansive neoclassical test imposes
liability where the product is defective because it fails either a consumer
expectation test or a risk-utility test. Section 402A was originally based
on consumer expectations, and many, but not all, jurisdictions split over
whether consumer expectations are an independent basis for liability,
64
but the classical revival aims to move away from the doctrine. Decisions
involving complex products (such as whether an airbag should deploy in
a low-impact collision) are argued to be beyond the ken of ordinary
consumer expectations, so the test may not be applied. 65 A limited
conception of consumer expectations as a matter of law also has been
presented, such as whether food served in a restaurant is expected to be
free of natural materials that might be hazardous, requiring a plaintiff to
161. American Tort Reform Association, ATRA Issues: Product Liability Reform, at
http://atra.org/show/7341 (last visited July 13, 2004).
162. Frances E. Zollers et al., Looking Backward, Looking Forward: Reflections on Twenty
Years of Product Liability Reform, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1019, 1033 (2000).
163. Roselyn Bonanti, Tort 'Reform' in the States, TRIAL, August 2000, at 28, 29.
164. Compare Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176, 185-186 (Mich. 1984) and Turner v.
General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 851 (Tex. 1979) (rejecting the idea that consumer
expectations are an independent basis for liability test) with Masaki v. General Motors Corp, 780
P.2d 566, 578-579 (Haw. 1989), and Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 709 P.2d 876, 878-880 (Ariz. 1985)
(adopting the idea that consumer expectations are an independent basis for liability).
165. Pruitt v. General Motors Corp, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 4 (Cal. App. 1999).
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prove negligence by the product seller.1 66 The Restatement (Third)
formalizes the trend by removing consumer expectations as a basis of
liability, maintaining it only as an element of its risk-utility test.
167
At the same time, challenges have moved the risk-utility test from
one of strict liability to negligence, except in limited situations. In its
classic formulation by Professor John Wade, the test directs a court to
consider the usefulness of the product to the user and to the public, the
likelihood that it will cause injury, the availability of substitutes, the
manufacturer's and the user's ability to control the risk, the user's
awareness of the danger, and the feasibility of the manufacturer
spreading the loss by setting the price of the product or carrying liability
insurance. 168 The first and last factors particularly distinguish the test
from a negligence standard; the focus is broader than the reasonableness
of the manufacturer's conduct, considering also the social utility of the
product and the loss-spreading capacity of the manufacturer.
The classical revival moves the risk-utility test to a negligence
standard, and so introduces a fault requirement into what was previously
strict products liability. 69 The Louisiana Products Liability Act
illustrates.' 70 To establish that a product is defective, a victim must prove
that at the time of manufacture, there existed an alternative design for the
product that would have prevented the injury, and that the likelihood and
severity of the injury "outweighed the burden on the manufacturer of
adopting such alternative design and the adverse effect, if any, of such
alternative design on the utility of the product." Under this formulation,
the risk-utility test trumps the consumer expectation test; even if the
product is more dangerous than the user would expect, it is not
necessarily defective. In applying the risk-utility test, the court is not to
consider the lack of social utility of the product and the possibility of loss
spreading. And the victim must prove that there was an alternative
design, and that the failure to adopt the alternative design was
unreasonable; that is, that the manufacturer was negligent.
The Restatement (Third) standard for defective design provides the
most controversial illustration of this approach. Although there was
166. Mexicali Rose v. Superior Court, 822 P.2d 1292 (Cal. 1992).
167. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY §2, cmt. f. (1998).
168. John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISS. L.J. 825, 837
(1973).
169. In some cases, the classical revival would further remove the question of fault from the
trier of fact by establishing government approval of a product as a preemptive or presumptive
judgment about its safety.
170. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:2800.51-2800.60 (West 2004).
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much debate at the time of the drafting of the Restatement,' 7' the weight
of authority is that the Restatement misstated the extant law. A week
after the ALI adopted the Restatement, the Connecticut Supreme Court
stated that the court's "independent review of the prevailing common law
reveals that the majority of jurisdictions" disagreed with the
Restatement, 72 and Professor John Vargo later published a mammoth
457-page article with 2403 footnotes that demonstrated the
Restatement's errors.1
73
The Restatement rolls back neoclassical principles in two ways.
First, it introduces a requirement that the plaintiff prove that a
"reasonable alternative design" was available to the product
manufacturer for the design to be defective. 174 Courts that allow liability
on the basis of violation of consumer expectations obviously do not
require a reasonable alternative design, but other courts require proof of
an alternative design without the cost-benefit inquiry that it be
reasonable, and perhaps most courts consider the alternative design only
as one of the factors in risk/utility balancing. 175  Second, the
Restatement's definition of factors relevant to risk/utility balancing 176 is
narrower than the list commonly employed by the courts, based on
Wade's leading article. Most importantly, the Restatement test ignores
the enterprise liability principle, "the feasibility, on the part of the
manufacturer, of spreading the loss by setting the price of the product or
carrying liability insurance."
177
3. Causation and damages
Two issues that cut across negligence and products liability are
causation and damages. A prominent development in causation in
neoclassical law was market-share liability. Sometimes the causal
connection between the harm caused by an individual defendant and the
harm suffered by an individual plaintiff cannot be firmly established, but
171. Compare Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, Tent. Draft No. 1 (April 12,
1994) §2, cmt. d, at 55-62, with Frank J. Vandall, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability Section 2(b): The Reasonable Alternative Design Requirement, 61 TENN. L. REv. 1407
(1994).
172. Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1331 n. I1 (Conn. 1997).
173. John F. Vargo, The Emperor's New Clothes: The American Law Institute Adorns a "New
Cloth For Section 402A Products Liability Design Defects-A Survey of the States Reveals a
Different Weave, 26 U. Mem. L. Rev. 493 (1996).
174. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY §2(b).
175. DOBBS, supra note 136, at 1001-02.
176. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY §2, cmt. f.
177. Wade, supra note 168, at 838. Similar limitations also have been adopted in tort reform
statutes and by a number of courts. E.g., TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 82.005(a), (b)
(Vernon 2004); see Hernandez v. Tokai Corp., 2 S.W. 3d 251 (Tex. 1999).
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it is clear that the harm caused by that and like defendants is exactly the
harm suffered by that and like plaintiffs. The issue arose in cases
involving the drug diethylstilbestrol (DES), which was administered to
pregnant women and decades later caused harm to their daughters. A half
dozen jurisdictions adopted the principle that the class of defendants and
class of plaintiffs would be matched, so that defendants would be liable
according to their share of the market for the drug, as defined under one
approach or another. Market share liability is consistent with a
conception of tort law as collective justice employing enterprise liability,
but the classical revival rejects that conception and so has rendered the
DES cases unique. The Restatement (Third), for example, labels the
principle uniquely applicable to those cases. 1
78
A principal focus of the classical revival has been the law of
damages. Some critiques are directed at joint and several liability, as
imposing damages out of proportion to fault, and the collateral source
rule, as allowing recovery of damages beyond the extent of loss. The
principal targets, however, have been damages for noneconomic loss and
punitive damages. Here once again the critique is directed at the
improper applications of fault principles by a distorted litigation system.
In the absence of standards for the award of these damages and swayed
by sympathy for the injured victim and distaste for the wrongdoer (often
a large corporation), juries are alleged to be likely to enter excessive
awards. This allegation of the tendency of juries to excess resolves what
would otherwise be a conflict between arbitrary and mechanical
limitations on damages and the vision of an individualized system of
corrective justice, in which awards should be set on a case-by-case basis.
The response to allegedly excessive awards for noneconomic loss
has been to propose caps on damages.179 The main focus has been on
medical malpractice cases. California was a leader; in 1975, its Medical
Injury Compensation Reform Act set a limit of $250,000 on
noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases, a limit that has not
since been raised.18 0 Other states include limits on the total damages that
can be awarded, including economic damages, without regard for the
nature of the injury or the amount of resulting harm; the Virginia law is
particularly harsh, limiting all damages to an amount set at $1.5 million
in 1999 and gradually increasing to $2 million in 2008.181 In several
178. DOBBS, supra note 136, at 430-31; see Schwartz, supra note 138, at 671; Enright v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 570 N.E.2d 198 (N.Y. 1991); see also Grover v. Eli Lilly & Co., 591 N.E.2d 696 (Ohio
1992).
179. DOBBS, supra note 136, at §384.
180. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2. (West 2004).
181. For the statute's effect, see Megan Rhyne, Cap Cuts Va's Largest Med-mal Award, NAT'L
L. J., Apr. 28, 2003, at BI.
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states with caps, negligent doctors and hospitals do not have to pay even
these limited amounts themselves; state-run victim compensation funds
pay a substantial portion. 82 Caps have been proposed in most states
affected by the insurance crisis, and federal preemption of tort law
through a national cap also has been proposed by President Bush.
183
Punitive damage reform has proceeded in the legislatures and in the
courts. The thrust of the statutory reforms includes establishing an actual
malice threshold' 8 4 and a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard for the
award of punitive damages,"' capping punitive damages by amount or
formula, 186 eliminating awards for the same conduct in multiple actions,
and increasing judicial review of jury awards.'8 7 Thirty-four states have
adopted some or all of these proposals by statute.'
88
A particularly successful litigation campaign against punitive
damages has been waged in the United States Supreme Court. In BMW of
North America, Inc. v. Gore,'89 the Court held that a state court could
only award damages to punish in-state conduct, and that constitutional
standards of the degree of reprehensibility of the conduct and the
relationship among compensatory damages, punitive damages, and
available civil penalties applied.' 90 In Cooper Industries, Inc. v.
Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.,' 9 1 contrary to its earlier suggestion in
Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,
192
the Court held that jury determinations were subject not only to review
by the trial judge, but that the trial judge's determination was subject to
review de novo by the appellate court. In State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. v. Campbell,193 the Court continued to narrow the
standards. First, in awarding punitive damages, a court can consider only
the wrong done to the individual victim, not a broader pattern of national
wrongdoing of which the particular case was an illustration. Second,
while ostensibly declining to impose a bright-line test for proportionality
182. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-6 (Michie 2003); IND. STAT. § 34-18-14-3 (2004).
183. Joseph B. Treaster, Malpractice Insurance: No Clear or Easy Answers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
5, 2003, at C 1.
184. E.g., Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 601 A.2d 633 (Md. 1992).
185. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-127 (2004).
186. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 2004); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § I -
108 (2004).
187. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(2)(a) (2003); MINN. STAT. § 549.20(5) (2003).
188. American Tort Reform Association, ATRA Issues: Tort Reform Record July 12, 2004,
available at http://www.atra.org/show/7347 (last visited July 24, 2004).
189. 517 U.S. 559(1996).
190. Id. at 572, 575.
191. 532 U.S. 424, 432-36 (2001).
192. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
193. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
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of compensatory and punitive damages, the Court noted that "few awards
exceeding a single-digit ratio" will be constitutional. Indeed, where there




Property law remains the most difficult to characterize of the
common-law subjects. Property, unlike contracts and to a much greater
extent than torts, is fragmented into doctrinal subcategories that make
generalization difficult. Themes and concepts run throughout the
different subjects, but the themes often do not operate significantly at the
doctrinal level.
Nevertheless, a survey of neoclassical property law as a whole
reveals distinctive features. Classical property law rested on a conception
of broad ownership rights derived more from principle than policy, with
the principal attribute of ownership being the ability to freely maximize
the value of property. Neoclassical law introduced policy into that
concept of ownership, with the allocation of property interests designed
to serve social needs. It revised or eradicated many of the traditional
doctrines in this most hidebound of legal subjects in the interest of
making property more amenable to commodified commercial
transactions on the market, a goal that would be congenial to many
classical theorists. At the same time, it recognized the limits of
commodified, market-based property interests by creating non-market
property and extending explicit state regulation over market interests. At
first glance, these developments may seem in conflict: to advance and
limit the commodification of property. Both these developments proceed
from the same insight, however, that property law is a matter of public
policy rather than individual right, so that the only relevant question is
how the policy balance should be struck on particular elements of the
law. As the New Jersey Supreme Court declared in State v. Shack,
"property serves human values;"'' 95 the issue is which values and how
they should be balanced. The creation of "new property" in forms of
government largess such as welfare benefits and public housing,'
96
control of the discrimination in the sale, rental, or use of property, 97 and
the diminution of the public purpose requirement and the increase in
deference to the legislature in takings law illustrate the applications of
policy that destroyed the Blackstonian conception of absolute property.
194. Id. at 410.
195. State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 372 (N.J. 1971).
196. Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
197. See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY §2.6 (2001).
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In many areas of property, the classical revival has hardly been felt,
due in large part to the technical nature of the subject. In other areas, as
with some of the tort law changes, its effect is a failure to progress along
lines established by neoclassical law, rather than an overt retreat. The
"new property," for example, failed to develop significantly. The
ambiguity in the new property was whether property rights in
government benefits flowed from the importance of the interest to the
holder or were the creation of positive law; the United States Supreme
Court tended to the latter interpretation, so the concept faltered.1 98
Among the regulatory elements, a major neoclassical development was
the revolution in landlord-tenant law, particularly in the expansion of
constructive eviction and the implied warranty of habitability. Some
attempts were made to move beyond these developments. A few courts
held that the expanded doctrines could apply to commercial leases as
well, 199 but most did not.200 The refusal to extend the doctrines is not in
itself extraordinary, as a matter of policy. It is noteworthy, however, that
the conclusion rests on a market-oriented assumption, that any
commercial party is able to bargain for protection, is not subject to the
imperfections of the residential housing market, and does not require the
same protection as a residential tenant.20 1
The challenges to neoclassical law are most evident in the area of
regulatory takings, in administrative, legislative, and constitutional
arenas. The framework for the challenges was established by Richard
Epstein's 1985 book Takings20 2 and then-Justice Rehnquist's dissent in
the Penn Central case.20 3
Epstein argued that property consists of a "natural and unique set of
entitlements," which are natural in that they are independent of positive
law and unique in the sense that there exists a single correct body of
property rights, always and everywhere.20 4 This body of property rights
"contains no gaps... For things reduced to ownership, the rules of
property uniquely specify the rights of all persons for all times... There
are no residual sticks in the bundle that move between the private and
198. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES §7.3.2 (2d ed.
2002).
199. Eg., Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 251 A.2d 268 (N.J. 1969); Davidow v. Inwood N.
Profl Group-Phase 1, 747 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. 1988).
200. SINGER, supra note 197, at 459.
201. See Paula C. Murray, The Evolution of Implied Warranties in Commercial Real Estate
Leases, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 145, 172-76 (1994).
202. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN (1985).
203. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 141 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
204. EPSTEIN, supra note 202, at 230-31.
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public domain at legislative whim." 20 5 Any government action that
restricts these rights is a taking, and the only remaining question is what
compensation is required.
In Penn Central, under New York City's historic preservation law,
the Landmarks Preservation Commission designated Grand Central
Station, owned by Penn Central, as a landmark and rejected Penn
Central's plans to construct a mammoth office building atop the
architecturally-significant station.20 6 Penn Central sued, claiming that the
refusal constituted a taking without just compensation. Justice Brennan's
majority opinion recognized the balancing inherent in property law.
"[T]his Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any 'set formula'
for determining when 'justice and fairness' require that economic
injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government."
Decisions depended on the particular circumstances in each case and
were "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries." The Court balanced the harm
to Penn Central and the character of the Commission's action, giving
deference to the commission's view of what would promote "the health,
safety, morals, or general welfare, 20 7 and concluded that the benefits of
the historic preservation scheme and Penn Central's ability to continue to
use the terminal for other purposes did not yield a taking.
For Justice Rehnquist, by contrast, property ownership was an
absolute, consisting of "every sort of interest" including "the right to
possess, use and dispose of it."' 20 8 The takings question does not require
balancing and ad hoc inquiries, but flows from the definitions of
"property," "taken," and "compensation;" what Justice Brennan's
opinion treats as fuzzy standards-factors to be considered and interests
to be weighed-Rehnquist treats as clear, fixed rules. When government
invades any interest in property, such as Penn Central's use of its air
rights to erect an office tower on top of the existing terminal, the
invasion constituted a taking. The only exceptions were cases of mutual
advantage (such as neighborhood zoning) or a historically-defined class
of cases in which the state regulation was preventing harm and protecting
the public health and safety by preventing a nuisance. In Penn Central's
case, though, the city was not protecting public health or safety but only
preserving the design of the building for "sightseeing New Yorkers and
,,209tourists.
205. Id. at 85.
206. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 104.
207. Id. at 123-124.
208. Id. at 143 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
209. Id. at 141, 143, 146 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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The Epstein-Rehnquist challenge to neoclassical property gave
justification to the classical revival conception of property and to the
"property rights movement," which has mounted a campaign to revise
existing law on regulatory takings.2 10 The first major success of the
campaign was in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.211 Lucas was
a developer who purchased two of the last four lots in an ocean-front
development. To protect the beach from erosion, to maintain the natural
dune barriers that provide storm breaks, and to prevent beachfront homes
from damaging inland property when swept away in storms, the state
prohibited construction on tidal areas such as Lucas's. 2 1 2 Lucas sued,
claiming that the regulation constituted a taking.1 3 The South Carolina
Supreme Court held that the state had the power to protect its public
resources in this way, under a line of Supreme Court authority mandating
deference to the legislative judgment of the public need and the
214reasonable exercise of the police power.
In an opinion by Justice Scalia, a majority of the Court held that
South Carolina's coastal zone management plan had taken Lucas's
215property.   The core of the opinion was the finding that the state's action
had denied the developer "all economically beneficial or productive use
of the land," and that denial constituted a taking. 1 6 That ruling was a
major departure from neoclassical property principles for three reasons.
First, it rested on the reinstatement of the concept that ownership
was absolute. Lucas was not barred from all use of his land, only from
building houses on it. But denying that one element of the bundle of
rights of ownership was sufficient to be a taking, especially because
under the economically oriented, market-based approach, making a profit
is the primary value of property.21 7
210. Douglas T. Kendall & Charles P. Lord, The Takings Project: A Critical Analysis and
Assessment of the Progress So Far, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 509, 526 (1998).
211. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
212. See id. at 1008.
213. Id. at 1009.
214. Id. at 1020-21.
215. Id. at 1032.
216. Id. at 1015, 1019.
217. The reinstatement of absolute ownership is especially striking in comparing Lucas to
Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979). Federal statutes prohibited the purchase or sale of feathers of
eagles and other protected birds, including Indian artifacts made with them. Id. at 54. The owners of
artifacts sued, claiming that the statutes worked a taking. Id. at 55. Although the statute had
extinguished these key elements of ownership, the Court found no taking. ld at 67-68.
"[G]overnment regulation-by definition-involves the adjustment of rights for the public good.
Often this adjustment curtails some potential for the use or economic exploitation of private
property. To require compensation in all such circumstances would effectively compel the
government to regulate by purchase." Id. at 65. In Andrus, not all of the rights of ownership had been
extinguished. The owners could look at the artifacts, give them away, or put them in a museum, see
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Second, the court gave short shrift to the state's interest in
protecting the coast. The police power-the government's traditional
power to protect the public health, safety, and welfare-could only
prevent a taking in the tautological situation in which the property owner
did not have a right to do what it proposed to do anyway. "Any limitation
so severe cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without compensation),
but must inhere in the title itself, in the . . . State's law of property and
nuisance already [in] place upon land ownership. ' 21 8 In short, the
common law of nuisance was frozen at some point in the hypothetical
past, and any attempt to impose new regulation, especially in the
interests of environmental protection, would be invalid.
Here there is a link to the Court's limitation of the new property. In
those cases, the Court generally adopts a positivist approach, holding that
holders of government benefits have property rights for due process
purposes only when they have a reasonable expectation of entitlement
under state law. 219 The question then arises whether the state could
specify limited rights in land and then take the land without due process.
The answer from Lucas is no, because common-law rights presumably
are immune from interference, as they "inhere in the title" under
traditional principles of property law.
Third, the result was stated as a "categorical rule., 220 The traditional
posture, expressed in every case through Penn Central, required that the
owner's interest be balanced against the state's interest. No more; Justice
Scalia substituted a rule for the traditional case-by-case adjudication.
Where there was a denial of the economically productive use of the land,
there was a taking, with no need to consider the state's interest.
Lucas did not signal the Court's wholesale adoption of property
rights arguments, as the three most conservative justices (Rehnquist,
Scalia, and Thomas) have only occasionally been able to enlist their less
extreme colleagues (particularly O'Connor and Kennedy) in the cause.
For example, in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency,2 2 1 the Court favored Penn Central's ad hoc
approach over Lucas's categorical rule in cases of "temporary takings"
222such as development moratoria during land planning processes.
id. at 65-66 and, unlike Lucas, the fact that their economic value may have been destroyed did not
give rise to a taking.
218. Id. at 1029.
219. See supra notes 192-194 and accompanying text.
220. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026.
221. 535 U.S. 498 (1998).
222. Id. at 329-330 (2002).
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But the justices favoring absolute property rights continue to press
the issue. Eastern Enterprises v. Apfe22 3 concerned the constitutionality
of an assessment against a former coal operator for the benefits fund of
retired miners. The Court decided the case 5-4, with Justice O'Connor
writing a plurality opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Thomas and Scalia, and with Justice Kennedy providing a fifth vote but
writing a separate opinion. The four plurality justices decided the case on
takings grounds, and Kennedy on due process grounds, all agreeing that
the Coal Act's retroactive imposition on Eastern was unconstitutional.
The plurality justices recognized that the takings argument was an
odd one. Not only was no physical property taken, but no identifiable
property interest at all was taken. Their theory was that company assets
had been taken, because assets that could have been used for other
purposes now had to be committed to the retired miners' benefits. Unlike
any prior case, the plurality justices could not point to a specific piece of
property or legal interest that the government had acquired or destroyed,
but for them, the creation of a new obligation was equivalent to a taking
of the company's property.
Although Justice Kennedy agreed with the result, he found the
takings analysis unprecedented. "Until today," he noted, "one constant
limitation has been that in all of the cases where the regulatory taking
analysis has been employed, a specific property right or interest has been
at stake. 2 24 Read broadly, the Eastern Enterprises reasoning poses a
threat to all government fees and even taxes. As Justice Breyer noted in
his dissent, "[i]f the [Takings] Clause applies when the government
simply orders A to pay B, why does it not apply when the government
simply orders A to pay the government, i.e., when it assesses a tax?
225
Charles Fried raised a similar question: "Uncompensated takings of
individual isolated holdings . . . are an evil, to be sure, but the
generalized confiscation implicit in very high marginal tax rates puts the
individual's property at least as much at the mercy of the state. 2 26
Meanwhile, the classical revival in property has proceeded on other
fronts. The Court of Claims and the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit have been especially congenial to takings claims. 2 7 In Loveladies
Harbor, Inc. v. United States2 8 and Palm Beach Isles Associates v.
223. 524 U.S. 498 (1998).
224. Id. at 541 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
225. Id. at 556 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
226. Charles Fried, Protecting Property-Law and Politics, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 44,
47(1990).
227. Kendall, supra note 210, at 566-71, 576-80.
228.28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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United States,229 for example, the Federal Circuit extended Lucas by
holding that the narrowest property interest possible should be viewed as
the subject of a taking.230 In Palm Beach Isles Associates, for example, a
developer had originally purchased a 31 1-acre tract, sold 261 acres, then
claimed that the denial of a permit to fill in forty-nine submerged acres
of the remaining fifty constituted a taking. 231 The developer argued, and
the court agreed, that the denominator was the portion of the parcel
regulated, rather than the entire parcel originally owned. 32
The classical revival and the property rights movement also have
motivated a number of states to adopt statutes that expand the scope of
the compensation requirement beyond what is constitutionally
required. 3  The most extreme state provision is Measure 7, an
amendment to the Oregon constitution adopted by referendum in 2000
and struck down by the Oregon Supreme Court on procedural grounds in
2002. Measure 7 would have required the payment of compensation
whenever the state or local government adopts a regulation that restricts
and thereby reduces the value of real property to any degree. The
measure allowed only three exceptions: nuisances recognized at common
law, implementing regulations required under federal law, and
restrictions on the use of property certain illicit purposes. As such, it
embodied an absolutist, anti-regulatory conception of property not seen
since the classical era.
D. Structure and Method
Classical legal thought constituted a complete system in that its
individual subjects were integrated by an approach to the structure of law
as a whole and a distinctive method of legal reasoning. The classical
revival's challenges to neoclassical contract, tort, and property law also
are connected by structure and method.
229. 208 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
230. Loveladies Harbor, Inc., 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Palm Beach Isles Assocs., 208
F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
231. Palm Beach Isle Assocs., 208 F.3d at 1377-78.
232. Id. at 1380-81. On remand, the claims court held that there was no taking of 49 acres that-
which were in navigable waters. 58 Fed. Cl. 657 (2003).
233. Mark W. Cordes, Leapfrogging the Constitution: The Rise of State Takings Legislation,
24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 187 (1997). Federal legislation also has been proposed but not adopted. See Glenn
Sugameli, Takings Bills Threaten Private Property, People, and the Environment, 8 ENVTL. L.J. 521
(1997); Glenn Sugameli, "Takings" Bills Threaten People, Property, Zoning and the Environment,




In structural terms, the boundaries between the areas of law are
more sharply defined than in neoclassical law; under the classical
revival, each area has its proper scope. Property and contract are linked
in a special way: contract provides the mechanism through which market
transactions can maximize the value of property. In contrast to
neoclassical law, there is a hierarchy among the subjects in which tort
law is inferior; conflicts between contract and tort are resolved in favor
of contract law. All of these distinctions are characterized by the
abstraction and decontextualization which is common to the challenges.
Consider several examples of the most common structural conflict,
that between contract and tort. Early cases allowed a tort action for bad
faith breach of contract by an insurance company, resting on the
company's failure to accept reasonable settlements of claims against its
insured, "a duty included within the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing., 234 Some courts extended the tort from third-party, liability
insurance cases to first-party, casualty insurance cases and then to
employment, banking, and franchise settings, with the possibility of
extending the bad faith tort to general commercial contracts.235
In Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.,236 the California Supreme Court
precluded the application of the bad faith tort to the employment area and
effectively foreclosed its expansion to other areas as well. Its opinion
was motivated by a model of tort and contract. The model rested on a
perception of a stark difference between tort and contract and on the
origins of the obligation of good faith in contract law.237
Because the obligation of good faith was a contract term, its scope
in any particular case depends on the intentions of the parties and the
reasonable expectations created by their contract, and contract damages,
not tort damages, provide the appropriate remedy for its breach. 8 The
insurance bad faith cases constituted an exception to this rule because the
unique characteristics of the insurance relationship removed the
obligation of good faith from the model of contract.
239
Another example is product-related economic loss. In Santor v. A &
M Karagheusian, Inc.,240 the first major third-party products case, the
234. Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 177 (Cal. 1967).
235. See Kerry L. Macintosh, Gilmore Spoke Too Soon: Contract Rises from the Ashes of the
Bad Faith Tort, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 483 (1994).
236. 765 P.2d 211 (Cal. 1988).
237. Id. at 389 (citation omitted).
238. "As a contract concept, breach of the duty led to imposition of contract damages
determined by the nature of the breach and standard contract principles." Id. at 389-90.
239. Id. at 390.
240. 207 A.2d 305 (N.J. 1965).
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New Jersey Supreme Court held that a consumer who purchased carpet
that developed unusual "lines" running through it had a cause of action in
tort against the manufacturer, even though the consumer also had a
remedy in contract for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.
"[T]he manufacturer's liability may be cast in simpler form" under the
doctrine of strict liability in tort. 24 1 Santor did not acquire much of a
following, however, and in Spring Motors Distributors Inc. v. Ford
Motor Co. 242 the court reversed course, at least with respect to
commercial parties. The court defined a model of contract, in which
commercial parties, who are presumed to have equal bargaining power,
can contract with respect to the risks that they could effectively bear.
This area is governed by the Uniform Commercial Code, "which
constitutes a comprehensive system for determining the rights and duties
of buyers and sellers with respect to contracts for, the sale of goods. 243
Only in classes of cases where the preconditions of contract-
comparable bargaining power and the ability to bear or distribute risks-
do not exist, does tort law appropriately govern.244 Personal injury caused
by a manufactured product is a prime example of an instance in which
the preconditions of contract do not exist, which is why strict liability is
imposed in that area.
The United States Supreme Court adopted the principle of Spring
Motors in East River S.S. Co. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc. 245 and
extended the principle to physical damage to the defective product:
Even when the harm to the product itself occur through an abrupt,
accident-like event, the resulting loss due to repair costs, decreased
value, and lost profits is essentially the failure of the purchaser to
receive the benefit of its bargain-traditionally the core concern of
contract law.
246
Only personal injury or damage to property other than the product
itself would activate the tort principles of products liability law.
A useful summary of the structure of the classical revival is
provided by an article in which William Powers, Jr., discusses the bad
faith tort in the context of the larger "border wars" between contract law
241. Id. at 311.
242. 489 A.2d 660 (1985). For a complete discussion of the case, see Patricia A. Brown & Jay
M. Feinman, Economic Loss, Commercial Practices, and Legal Process: Spring Motors Distrib, Inc.
v. Ford Motor Co., 22 RUTGERS L.J. 301 (1991).
243. Spring Motor Distrib. Inc., 489 A.2d at 665.
244. Classes of cases, that is, not individual cases, which would require too contextual an
inquiry.
245. 476 U.S. 858 (1986).
246. Id. at 870.
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and tort law. 247 Powers defines the "basic paradigms" of private law,
each of which has a "prime directive" or central organizing principle:
" The tort or negligence paradigm reflects the basic norm that
people should act reasonably under the circumstances. If people
do not act reasonably, this norm demands that they should then
compensate those whom they foreseeably injure ....
* [T]he property paradigm gives individuals entitlements to do as
they please with their own property ....
* The contract paradigm expresses the basic norm that
individuals should be able to agree between and among
themselves how to allocate resources. Contract law does not
itself give entitlements or independently evaluate the
reasonableness of each party's conduct; instead, it establishes a
structure within which individuals can voluntarily bargain and
reach their own agreements. 48
Each paradigm assigns authority for development of the content of
the law to a different institution. The contract and property paradigms
assign responsibility to individuals through actions in the private market.
Tort, on the other hand, assigns power to courts and juries.
When the paradigms potentially overlap, conflicts between them
can be resolved by a resort to their purposes, which are reflected in the
structure of the common law under the classical revival.
In fact, an examination of this Balkanized structure [of the three
subjects] reveals that the paradigms of the different bodies of law
are not really coequal. The negligence paradigm takes a back seat.
As we have seen, contract law embodies the ideology of autonomy
and consent and assigns decisionmaking power to markets.
Sometimes, however, the predicates for the application of contract
law are not present, for example, when disputes arise between
noncontracting strangers or when a party to a contract is mentally
incompetent. Thus, we do not need to refer either to another body of
law-such as tort law--or to some extra-doctrinal normative system
in order to keep contract law from devouring the entire legal world.
Contract law, along with its accompanying prime directive of
agreement and consent, sets its own limits. Tort law waits in the
background to step in and resolve the disputes that occur when no
contractual relationship is present. In other words, tort law fills in
247. William Powers, Jr., Border Wars, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1209, 1209 (1994).
248. Id at 1210-11 (footnote omitted). Powers also defines paradigms in property law and
criminal law or legislative and administrative regulation. Id. at 1211 -2.
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when, due to contract law's own rules about its applicability, we do
not have the option of using contract law.
A similar relationship exists between tort law and property law.
Resolving disputes through property entitlements, which in turn can
be bought and sold in the marketplace, has advantages over a case-
by-case determination of reasonableness.249
2. Method
The challenges to neoclassical private law include a new orientation
to legal method as well as to substance and structure. The method is
more formal than neoclassical law, and there has been much academic
discussion of this "new formalism" in both public and private law. 250 But
formalism is too broad a term to capture what is going on in the new
approach to legal method.
Classical legal thought defined the problem of legal method as
keeping legal reasoning (the decision from legal doctrine, as done in
courts) distinct from policy-oriented legislative reasoning.15 Classical
law resolved this problem through a legal method that was autonomous
and determinate: courts could deductively apply legal rules and
principles without regard for their social consequences to produce certain
results in particular cases. The critique of classical legal thought
252
undermined the claims of autonomy and determinacy. 2 Critics
demonstrated that the classical structure, principles, and method were
inadequate to the task of producing a formal legal system. Courts
249. Id. at 1224-25 (footnotes omitted). Other participants in the Texas Law Review
symposium shared Powers's conception of a contract-based structure. See Dennis Patterson, Good
Faith in Tort and Contract Law: A Comment, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1291, 1292 (1994) ("Relative to
contract law, tort is a 'gap-filler'-and one of a special, limited sort. Put simply, tort law should never
subordinate consent, and making breach of the duty of good faith actionable in tort would do just
that."); Robert H. Jerry 11, The Wrong Side of the Mountain: A Comment on Bad Faith's Unnatural
History, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1317, 1342 (1994) ("Because I agree with Professor Powers that tort law is
not a co-equal paradigm with contract law, I conclude that tort law has infringed upon contract law's
rightful territory.").
250. See, e.g., Symposium, Formalism Revisited, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 527 (1999); Grey, supra
note 8; Robert A. Hillman, The "New Conservatism" in Contract Law and the Process of Legal
Change, 40 B.C. L. REV. 879 (1999); Eric Posner, The Decline of Formality in Contract Law, in
THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 61 (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999); William J.
Woodward, Jr., Neoformalism in a Real World of Forms, 2001 WiS. L. REV. 971 (2001).
25 1. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text. It provides useful perspective to see that
this problem is a product of classical legal thought. The problem had been percolating for some time
before, but at least fifty or seventy-five years earlier, the integration of law, custom, and policy were
such that there was no perception of a problem. See HORWITZ, supra note 7, at ch.I.
252. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 28:1
Un-Making Law
necessarily engaged in the allocation of rights, not just the application of
rights, and so were engaged in the making of public policy.
Some of the most policy-oriented of the critics were unconcerned
by this similarity and urged the courts to embrace a legislative role. But
that path was too extreme for most legal scholars, ordinary judges and
lawyers and, ultimately, the social and political environment in which
they operated. Accordingly, as neoclassical law matured it developed a
distinctive legal method that preserved a role for doctrine and a relatively
autonomous legal method. Under neoclassical law, ordinary cases are
handled by a deductive method in which doctrinal principles are applied
straightforwardly to sets of facts. The principles are adequate for
ordinary cases, but not for unusual cases, and it is recognized that even in
the ordinary cases their application is always provisional. The principles
are based on policy, they are typically cast as standards rather than rules,
and they require detailed factual determinations, all of which leaves
considerable but not unlimited room for judicial discretion.
The classical revival rejects the neoclassical resolution of the
problem of legal method.2 53 It attempts to solve the problem by
reinstating elements of the classical approach in a revised form-an
"anti-antiformalism"-it being not so much classical formalism as a
formalist reaction to the critique and its neoclassical progeny.
254
This method has its roots in the substance of the classical revival.255
The core of the substance is an idealized market in which autonomous
individuals contract to maximize their wealth. This resembles the
classical ideal of the market, but it gives more room for state intervention
to maintain the conditions under which the market can operate by
enforcing legal rules that support the market and, to a very limited extent,
to correct market failures and provide remedies in non-market
transactions.
253. As did the critical legal studies movement. See, e.g., Jay M. Feinman, Critical
Approaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. REV. 829, 847 (1983); Kennedy, From the Will Theory to
the Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon Fuller's "Consideration and Form," supra note 19, at 112-
130.
254. David Chamy, The New Formalism in Contract, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 842, 842-43 (1999).
255. The extent to which substance and form are linked is a complex one. The canonical text is
Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685
(1976). See also KENNEDY, CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION, supra note 19, at 46-48. Thomas Grey
takes a broad reading of the "new formalism" in legal method, arguing that it attracts liberals,
centrists, and technical scholars as well as conservatives. "[Alt its theoretical core," he suggests, "the
new formalism is just the old legal pragmatism, now mostly in the hands of conservatives rather than
Progressives, New Dealers, and post-New-Deal liberals." Grey, supra note 8, at 29. Its conservative
association is a historical accident; the liberalism of the judiciary between 1940 and 1980 naturally
produced a conservative response, and because the liberalism was anti-formal, the conservative
response was formal. Id. at 14-15, 24. As the text suggests, I believe Grey understates the link
between the substance and form in the classical revival.
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This substance has methodological consequences. First, there is a
preference for determinate rules over standards. Rules clarify the rights
and obligations of market participants; this facilitates market transactions
by enabling parties to plan more effectively and by reducing the
opportunities for judicial interference. Second, the rules are such that
they require less extensive factual inquiry. In particular cases, courts may
engage in considerable discussion of the facts, but the purpose of doing
so is to provide, as it were, the middle term of a syllogism; if certain
facts are present, then a result follows from the rule. This contrasts with
neoclassical law, in which fact finding serves as part of the balancing
process in the application of a standard and as a basis for policy-making
in the formulation of rules, subrules, and exceptions to rules.
These forms of rule preference permit a relatively effective
deductive process to operate at several levels. Rules are derived from
market principles, sub-rules are derived from more general rules, and
individual results are derived from the sub-rules. As a result, courts have
less discretion in defining rules of law and juries have less discretion in
applying them.
So far this description resembles the method of classical legal
thought, with a shift in emphasis from rights derived from abstract,
quasi-natural principle to rights derived from the ideal market. But there
is an important difference. Policy was largely absent in classical law, but
after decades of critique and neoclassical law, it is hard for the challenge
to neoclassical law to forsake that development entirely. Policy is part of
the challenge, but in particular ways.
First, the policy arguments are constrained by the market-oriented
substance. Neoclassical law embodied a conflict of policies, which can
be captured as market versus non-market or individualist versus
collectivist; that is what made it neoclassical. Not so in the current
challenges; the policies argued are substantially weighted in support of
the ideal market. If neoclassical policy argument reflects a form of
pluralist, interest group politics, the policy argument of its challengers
reflects a kind of universalism or social absolutism, in which only market
concerns deserve substantial weight because they benefit everyone.
Second, policy tends to be applied wholesale rather than retail. In
neoclassical law, policy arguments were applied quite particularly, on
individual issues of doctrine. In the recent challenges, the tendency is
more to make policy arguments in support of market solutions generally,
and the arguments simply resonate at the level of particular doctrinal
issues. This is formalist reasoning in the sense that the market norms are
presumed to generate sub-rules in a relatively direct fashion and with
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particular results.256 Grey nicely sums up this element of the new
formalism as "treating doctrinal elaboration as a search for coherent
structures of general concepts and principles, rather than as a process of
gap-filling sublegislation ancillary to particularized dispute
resolution."
257
III. CONCLUSION: THE CLASSICAL REVIVAL IN CONTEXT
Grant Gilmore famously remarked that there are alternating tides in
law, just as in art, architecture, music, and fashion-classicism to
romanticism, formality to flexibility, and back again. 58 One might
consider the changes in the common law to be little more than a
reflection of political fashion in the current, more conservative era that
follows the liberalism of the 1960s and 1970s. In context, however, the
classical revival is remarkable.
In historical context, the revival represents a conceptual regress.
Despite alternating styles, law has generally been assumed to progress
over time. Rules and decisions will always be inadequate and mistakes
will always be made, but at least they will be new mistakes, not
repetitions of past errors. The appropriate metaphor for legal
development is a spiral, back and forth but continually upward. The
classical revival, in its reinstatement of an ostensible formality and
reliance on principles assumed to be fundamental, simply updates
positions that the critique of classical legal thought demonstrated to be
flawed almost a century ago. The movement is radical, not conservative,
in rejecting that demonstration. Justice Scalia asserts that there are
categorical rules of property;259 Hohfeld knew better in 1917.260 Tort
reformers argue for a simple principle of fault as the basis of personal
injury law; Leon Green showed in 1928 that no simple principle
existed. 6' Judge Alex Kozinski claims that we need to restore the
"sanctity of contract; ' '262 Robert Hale explained why that was a bankrupt
concept in 1943.263 Professor Epstein states there are simple rules that
can govern a complex world; 264 Hohfeld, Green, Hale, and other
256. Kennedy, Legal Consciousness, supra note 7, at 105-109.
257. Grey, supra note 8, at 2.
258. GILMORE, supra note 9, at 102-103. Gilmore even foresaw an element of the classical
revival, a formal style that he labeled the New Conceptualism. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF
AMERICAN LAW 107-08 (1977).
259. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1026 (1992).
260. See supra note 27.
261. See supra note 38.
262. See Oki Am., Inc. v. Microtech Int'l, Inc., 872 F.2d 312, 314-317 (9th Cir. 1989).
263. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
264. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1995).
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scholars, and Benjamin Cardozo, Roger Traynor, and scores of other
judges have known better for generations.
This error is puzzling as an intellectual matter, but its origins are
very clear if the classical revival is seen in its contemporary context. The
unmaking of the common law is consistent with the contemporary
campaign by political conservatives and business interests to reshape
265American government, law, and society.
Ronald Reagan proclaimed the principal item on the agenda of this
campaign most baldly in his first inaugural address: "Government is not
the solution to our problems; government is the problem. 266 If
government is the problem, then the solution is to reduce the reach of
government. Anti-tax activist Grover Norquist declared the movement's
ambition to be cutting the size of federal, state, and local government in
half, to "get it down to the size where we can drown it in the bathtub.
2 67
Many government programs can be reduced or eliminated altogether;
others will be cut by shifting responsibility from the federal government
to the states and from government to the market. Publicly-supported
retirement and health care will be replaced by private investment
accounts instead of Social Security and HMOs and private prescription
insurance instead of Medicare. Public support of education will be
replaced by voucher-funded school choice. Public welfare, already
reformed "as we know it" under centrist Democrat Bill Clinton, will be
supplanted by voluntary, faith-based initiatives. Tax cuts will starve
government across the board.
In this vision, government is the problem because it interferes with
individual freedom, particularly the individual freedom to pursue self-
interest through the market. Conservatives idealize and worship the
market as the single social institution that produces efficient, just, and
democratic results: "One market under God," as Thomas Frank has
styled it.2
68
The master narrative of the vision of market centrality is
Reaganesque: Once upon a time there was a golden age when a man
(always a man) could stand on his own two feet, his rights inviolate.
Individual liberty, personal responsibility, and economic opportunity
were the foundations of American life. Society was organized and
controlled by two institutions: the market and the state. The market was
265. See FEINMAN, supra note 2, at ch. 8.
266. JOHN B. JUDIS & RUY TEIXEIRA, THE EMERGING DEMOCRATIC MAJORITY 151-52
(2002).
267. Laura Blumenfeld, "Sowing the Seeds of GOP Domination," WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 2004,
at A01.
268. THOMAS FRANK, ONE MARKET UNDER GOD (2000).
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primary; through it, people could maximize their potential, realize their
dreams, and rise or fall on their own merits. The state was subordinate;
beyond its minimal functions of guaranteeing physical security,
providing public goods, and protecting individual rights, government
offered only the possibility of unwise and pernicious interference in the
social order created by the market.269
The narrative is hardly new or unique. Judge Posner traces the
ideology's roots to the classical liberalism of John Stuart Mill:
[T]he government's role is to provide an unobtrusive framework for
private activities. Government provides certain goods, such as
national defense and (in some versions) education, that private
markets will not provide in sufficient quantities. But beyond that it
merely protects a handful of entitlements (property rights and some
personal liberties) that are necessary to prevent markets from not
working at all or from running off the rails.
27 °
But the breadth of the market fervor in the modern conservative era
is striking. "More than anything else," said Reagan, "I want to see the
United States remain a country where someone can get rich. 271 In this
narrative, the ideal state of affairs was corrupted by liberal politicians
and judges who expanded the role of government and thereby disrupted
the natural and just order of things. When government spread beyond its
proper role of protecting individual rights and preserving market
competition through fixed rules known in advance, it began down "The
Road to Serfdom," as Austrian economist Friedrich Hayek entitled his
2721944 book which became an instant best seller in the United States. -
The mainstream discourse of conservatism seldom makes explicit
the place of the common law in this picture, but a vision of the common
law is central to the conservative ideology, and the conservative ideology
is central to contemporary changes in the common law. The ideal of
individual freedom and limited government and the classical revival
conceptions of property, contract, and tort law are mutually reinforcing.
The protection of absolute private property is "the foundation from
which America's prosperity was launched., 273 The "sanctity of contract"
also is a condition of freedom, according to Judge Kozinski. The role of
courts, therefore, is simply to enforce the contracts the parties appear to
269. See Braucher, supra note 80, at 56.
270. Richard A. Posner, An Army of the Willing, NEW REPUBLIC, May 19, 2003, at 27.
271. KEVIN PHILLIPS, WEALTH AND DEMOCRACY 333 (2002).
272. GEORGE H. NASH, THE CONSERVATIVE INTELLECTUAL MOVEMENT IN AMERICA: SINCE
1945 5-6 (1976).
273. Henry Lamb, Why the Government is Grabbing Our Land, Defenders of Property Rights,
at http://www.yourpropertyrights.org/scandalsheet/030527.asp (last visited July 13, 2004).
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have made, not to assess their reasonableness or fairness: "Like other
aspects of personal autonomy, [freedom of contract] is too easily
smothered by government officials eager to tell us what's best for US."
2 74
Tort law supplements property and contract law in the relatively few
cases of wrongful acts that cause injury. The Reagan Administration's
Tort Policy Working Group called fault "the only vehicle in tort law
capable of distinguishing wrongful (or undesirable) from beneficial (or
desirable) conduct,, 275 but the fault principle has been corrupted by
activist judges and grasping lawyers.
The radical conservative, business-oriented agenda in property,
contract, and tort law fits well with the broader ideology of individualism
and the free market.276 This ideology also promotes an understanding of
the common law as nonpolitical. The common law is portrayed
exclusively as a realm of corrective justice, righting wrongs between
individuals according to objective principles of law, as contrasted with
the political choices made in electoral politics and in legislation. In this
understanding, the choice of common-law rules that favor the
conservative conception of private property, freedom of contract, and
limited tort law is not a political choice; indeed, it is hardly a choice at
all. Instead, the substance of the common law and the process of judicial
decision-making reside as a neutral background against which "real"
political conflicts are played out. The common law, like the interstate
highway system, is simply part of the natural, nonpolitical infrastructure
of society. In this way, conservatives attempt to withdraw from the realm
of politics the allocation of economic, political, and social values by the
common law.
But like the interstate highway system, the conservative vision of
the common law is neither natural nor nonpolitical.277 Instead, it furthers
the economic interests of big business and the political interests of
conservative politicians, and it promotes an ideology in support of those
interests. Contemporary conservatives are "rolling back the twentieth
century," returning America to the Gilded Age, with George W. Bush
274. Oki Am., Inc. v. Microtech Int'l, Inc., 872 F.2d 312, 316 (9th Cir. 1989).
275. REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP, supra note 143, at 31-32.
276. But see Robert A. Hillman, The "New Conservatism" in Contract Law and the Process of
Legal Change, 40 B.C. L. REv. 879 (1999) (questioning whether "new conservatism" in contract
law, if any, favors elites).
277. The interstate highway system, the "cathedral of the car culture," was the product of a
political victory by a coalition including truckers, auto manufacturers, big city politicians, and road
contractors that ended up shaping urban planning and starving the railroads. See generally STEPHEN




playing the part of William McKinley. 278 Classical legal thought reigned
in the Gilded Age, and the classical revival in the common law presents
the same challenge to what throughout the twentieth century became the
mainstream of American law as conservatism generally presents to the
mainstream of American government.
278. William Greider, That's the Grand Ambition: Rolling Back the Twentieth Century,
NATION, May 12, 2003, at 11; Robin Toner, Conservatives Savor Their Role as Insiders in the White
House, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2001, at Al; Bill Keller, Reagan's Son, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 26,
2003, at 26; Bill Moyers, This is Your Story-The Progressive Story of America. Pass It On., at
http://www.commondreams.org/views03/0610-11 .htm (last visited July 13, 2004); Posner, supra
note 250.
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